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I. INTRODUCTION
Britain in the latter decades of the eighteenth-century was well along the path to
becoming an imperial power, with commercial interests and rivalries stretching from
the South Pacific, to the Indian subcontinent, to the Atlantic coast of Africa, and
thence to the Caribbean and North America.! Indeed, the American War of
Independence represented only a brief interlude in this period of expansion, and its
conclusion only served to open new opportunities to British merchants and manu-
facturers.2
British thinkers were accordingly being forced to come to terms with a novel and
important problem: how to govern an empire comprised of European and non-
European peoples with vastly different cultures and histories?3 One important answer
to this question was provided by Edmund Burke, eighteenth-century parliamentarian
and political thinker. Born in Ireland in 1729 of a Catholic mother and a father who
had only recently-and in all probability only nominally--converted to Protes-
tantism, Burke was himself an outsider in both an ethnic and social sense.4 Burke
attended college in Dublin, and subsequently received substantial legal training at the
Inns of Court in London, although he preferred as a young man to pursue a career as
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1. See RicHARDBROWN, SOCIETYANDECONOMYIN MODERN BRITAIN 1700-1850,163 (1991) ("After 1750
both the amount of trade and the rate of growth showed dramatic increases. Between 1750 and 1770 the average
rate of growth was 1.7 per cent per annum and between 1770 and 1800 2.6 per cent annually.").
2. Jd. at 164.
3. It must be borne in mind that in the eighteenth century "the almost unquestioningly positive imperialist
spirit we associate with the Victorian empire was a thing of the future." See FREDERICK G. WHELAN, EDMUND
BURKE AND INDtA: POLITCAL MORALITY AND EMPIRE 19 (1996).
4. On the details of Burke's parentage, see CONOR CRUISE O'BREN, THE GREAT MELODY: A THEMAIC
BIOGRAPHY AND COMMENTED ANTHOLOGY OF EDMUND BURKE 3-11 (1992).
1997/Diversity In Western Constitutionalism
a writer.' Raised in modest economic circumstances, Burke experienced financial
difficulties nearly all of his life. 6 Whether this background and its attendant
experiences made him the willing mouthpiece of "traditional landed aristocracies"
or "a defender of the oppressed and an opponent of power when wielded arbitrarily"
need not be resolved here.7 No doubt, however, this background conferred on Burke
an acute awareness of what it meant to be subject to distant and arbitrary authority.
Unlike most of his contemporaries in British politics, Burke was raised in what was
in many respects a colonial setting, among a people grown restive at English
domination.8
By the late 1750s Burke was actively attempting to chart a political career for
himself. In 1759, he took a position as assistant to William Gerard Hamilton, a
leading member of Parliament, and, after quarreling with Hamilton, in the summer
of 1765 became personal secretary to Charles Watson Wentworth, the Second
Marquis of Rockingham, the Lord of the Treasury and the prime minister of
England.9 He was elected to Parliament in his own right in December, 1765, and
almost at once came to prominence with a speech on American affairs.'0 Much of
Burke's subsequent career-he would serve in Parliament until retiring in 1794-
would be taken up with debates on the proper response to empire-whether it be
India, Ireland, or America.
This Article hopes to provide insight on Burke's whole notion of empire, but also
intends to shed light on his understanding of chartered rights, constitutionalism, and
natural law. The question of empire is, of course, a perennially important one, but it
is made more urgent today by the rise of a world that features, on the one hand,
political domination by a single "superpower," and, on the other, a newly heightened
sense of cultural awareness among non-Western peoples." One should thus not find
5. On this background, see STANLEYAYLING, EDMUND BURKE: HIS LIFE AND OPINIONS 1-22 (1988).
6. See id. at 23-38 (discussing the vicissitudes of Burke's fortune).
7. This is the problem framed by WHELAN, supra note 3, at 8. Very likely, it helped make Burke "one of
the first major Western thinkers to grapple with the moral and political problems of European empire over non-
Western nations." Id. at 5.
8. See JOHN O'BEmNERANELAGH, ASHORTHSTORYOFIRELAND 33-34 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that Ireland
has experienced a turbulent relationship with Great Britain since the twelfth century, when Pope Adrian IV. by the
terms of the decree Laudabiliter conferred on Henry II the right to rule in Ireland). Matters became particularly
bloody in the mid-seventeenth century, during the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell, who made it English policy
to resettle Protestant loyalists in Ireland at the expense of the native Irish population. Id. at 60-65. The Irish Catholic
population in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were subjected to a series of legal disabilities, called
collectively the "Penal Laws" that stripped them of most of their civil rights. Id. at 67-77.
9. On biographical details, see O'BREEN, supra note 4, at 39, 44-48; see also AYLING, supra note 5, at 16-
24 (chronicling Burke's accomplishments).
10. See O'BRIEN. supra note 4, at 50 (discussing Burke's election); i at 107-08 (reacting to Burke's first
speech); see also AYLING, supra note 5, at 26 (explaining the impression Burke made in his first months in
Parliament).
11. Influential thinkers have recently argued for the consolidation of an American global hegemony to
ensure world order. Thus Charles Krauthammer has written: "The center of world power is the unchallenged
superpower, the United States, attended by its western allies .... Our best hope for safety ... is in American
strength and will-the strength and will to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order
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it surprising that Burke's writings on imperial relations are now being discussed as
a foundation for future world order. 12
But Burke's writings on empire are also a chief source for much contemporary
constitutional and jurisprudential analysis since it was in the cauldron of debate over
imperial governance that Burke articulated his more basic constitutional and
philosophical concerns. Scholars have looked to this body of work for inspiration in
resolving pressing constitutional controversies,1 3 as a means of criticizing con-
temporary conservative legal thought, 4 and as a source of basic constitutional
principles.' s Others have looked to Burke's traditionalism as a foundation for
American thought on the process of adjudication and the doctrine of precedent.16
and being prepared to enforce them." See Charles Krauthammer, Unipolar Moment, in RETHINKING AMERICA'S
SECURITY: BEYOND COLD WAR To NEW WORLD ORDER 56-57 (Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds.,
1992). William Kristol and Robert Kagan, similarly, have argued that America's international role should aim
toward "benevolent global hegemony." See William Kristol & Robert Kagan, Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign
Policy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 20 (JulylAugust, 1996). Cf. LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: POLITICAL
MORALITY IN A ONE-SUPERPOWER WORLD (1994) (arguing that if American hegemony is necessary, it ought to
follow basic principles of political liberalism, such as respect for human rights); Fernando R. Teson, International
Ethics for a New Era: The Problem of the Kind World Policeman, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 681, 681 (1995) (reviewing
Brilmayer).
At the level of political theory, one sees a division between those who argue that with the collapse of the
competing ideology of Soviet-style communism, we have reached the end of history, i.e., the completion of the
dialectic that gave shape and substance to Western political liberalism, and those who claim that we are entering
a new world of cultural rivalry and political fragmentation. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY
AND THE LAST MAN (1992) (arguing for the "end of history"); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF
CVmIIAONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996) (arguing that we are entering a new period of global
competition centered on competing civilizations); Samuel P. Huntington, The West: Unique, Not Universal,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 28 (NovJDec., 1996) (arguing for the uniqueness of Western political experience); BENJAMIN
F. BARBER, JnAD vs. McWoRtw (1995) (exploring the clash between cultural integrity and economic development);
ROBERT D. KAPLAN, THE ENDS OFTHE EARTH: A JOURNEY AT THE DAWN IFTE 21ST CENTURY (1996) (recounting
a vivid account of contemporary political fragmentation).
12. See David P. Fidler, Caught Between Traditions: The Security Council in Philosophical Conundrum,
17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 411, 440, 445 (1996).
13. See, e.g., Keith Werhan, The Liberalization of Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court, 80 IOWA
L. REV. 51, 94-99 (1994) (arguing for a "Burkean" reform of free-speech practice). Cf. Thomas C. Berg, Church-
State Relations and the Social Ethics of Reinhold Neibuhr, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1567, 1593-94 (1995) (examining the
Burkean foundations of Niebuhr's thought).
14. See Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 659-86 (1994) (using Burke to criticize contemporary conservative legal
scholarship); James G. Wilson, Justice Diffused: A Comparison of Edmund Burke's Conservatism with the Views
of Five Conservative, Academic Judges, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 913, 943-73 (1986) (criticizing Justice Scalia and
Judges Bork, Posner, Easterbrook, and Winter in light of Burkean principles).
15. See RussELL KnKuc TIE CONSERVAT[VE CONsTuTiON 80-98 (1990) (reviewing Burke's influence on
American constitutional principles); Russell Kirk, Natural Law and the Constitution of the United States, 69 NOTRE
DAIM L. REV. 1035, 1037 (1994) (examining Burke's constitutionalism). Cf. E.F. Roberts, Book Review, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1220-21 (1985) (reviewing FERNAND BRAUDEL, THEPERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD (1984))
(looking to Burke to argue that the American Revolution was the result of different interpretations of the British
Constitution).
16. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047-64 (1990)
(grounding his jurisprudential traditionalism in Burkean thought); Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's
Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1605 (1985) (considering the Burkean foundations of Bickel's
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This Article, however, does not to intend draw inevitably simplistic "lessons"
from Burke's time for the proper structuring of international law, or for constitutional
analysis, or for jurisprudence. In focusing our analysis on a careful reconstruction of
Burke's arguments on empire and the ways in which vastly different societies-
Indian, Irish, and American-might live together under one sovereign, we are
following the admonition of Martin Flaherty to avoid history "lite" when writing
about constitutional development. We write rather as historians, who hope that the
patient reconstruction of the arguments and ideas-indeed, the drama--of Burke's
response to empire might deepen our awareness and enrich our response to the vital
issues of the day. We hope that a close study of Burke's texts will assist in the
"rediscovery of America's formative constitutional tradition" through an examination
of the ideas of a leading British statesman acutely sensitive to the American cause.17
II. THE FRAGILITY OF ORDER
Fundamentally, Burke's prescriptions for colonial policy rest on his respect for
pre-existing societies. Indeed, he believed such respect was mandated by a British
Constitution which was based not only on principles of limited government and
separation of powers, but on a universal, immutable natural law requiring that
governors protect the varied interests of the peoples governed.18 The English were
required by morality and tradition to govern their possessions in accordance with the
needs of their inhabitants.1 9 Otherwise, they would become tyrants and undermine
their own Constitution, along with the liberties it protected.20
thought); Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZo L. REV.
601, 692-93 (1993) (tracing Alexander Bickel's philosophy to Burke); Peter Read Teachout, 7he Soul of the Fugue:
An Essay on Reading Fuller, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1073, 1077-80 (1986) (analyzing Burke's influence on Lon Fuller).
Anthony Kronman's recent call to the legal profession to return to the ideal of the "lawyer-statesman," who
embodies a sense of prudence and wisdom, is itself influenced in part by Alexander Bickel and Bickel's reliance
on Burke. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 24-26,50
(1993).
17. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 523,
528 (1995).
18. See BRUCE P. FROHNEN, VIRTUE AND THE PROMISE OF CONSERVATISM: THE LEGACY OF BURKE AND
TOCQUEVILLE 15-41 (1993) (explaining Burke's use of the natural-law tradition); PETER STANLIS, EDMUND BURKE:
THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND REVOLUTION 3-61 (1990). On the relationship of the British Constitution and natural
law in Burke's mind, see id. at 73-74.
19. Jennifer Welsh has observed: "Most importantly, British rule over the Empire must conform itself to
the 'character and circumstances' of the people who comprise this 'strangely diversified mass."' JENNIFER M.
WELSH, EDMUND BURKE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE COMMONWEALTH OF EUROPE AND THE CRUSADE
AGAINSTTHE FRENCH REVOLUTION 64 (1995) (quoting Edmund Burke, Letter to the Sheriffs, II WORKS 217).
20. See IAINHAMPSHER-MONK, THEPOLTICALPHi.OSOPHYOFEDMUNDBURKE 15 (1987) (explaining that
the fear of the empire degenerating into tyranny was a constant concern for those, like Burke, with classical training,
since "the acquisition of empire-as the examples of Athens and Rome showed-was bound to bring about the
eventual destruction of the free institutions which had given rise to it, and their substitution by a single absolute
ruler.").
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Burke argued that societies are fragile and must be allowed to develop through
the natural interaction of pre-existing institutions, beliefs, and practices with
changing circumstances.21 Prudence (or practical wisdom) was the prime political
virtue because it would guide the statesman in facing changing circumstances so as
to maintain the coherence of his society?2 Burke also placed great weight on the
importance of the contingent and the particular in forming a society.2 On the other
hand, abstract, rationalist plans for the perfection of society would tear the fragile
social fabric and bring chaos.24
Not all societies are worth conserving. French revolutionary society, for
example, was hostile to moral order and so could not be tolerated2s But any society
capable of maintaining a stable moral order deserved acceptance. Thus Burke argued
that England had a moral duty to run its empire so as to preserve the fragile fabric of
the societies it ruled.
Burke's theory of empire rested on three essential foundations: the need to
respect the chartered rights of the members of the empire and their traditional course
of dealings with the central authority; the preservation of the basic rights and liberties
of the British Constitution; and the observance of the teachings of natural law?6
Francis Canavan has characterized Burke's views on England's duties toward its
possessions as amounting to a theory of trusteeship.2 7 Indeed, Canavan sees
trusteeship at the root of much of Burke's political philosophy. According to
Canavan, "Government by the landed aristocracy is for the benefit, not of the
21. Id. at 36 ("The preservation of political institutions, the customs and beliefs on which they depend, and
the transmission of the whole through time is, for Burke, the most important duty of the politician .... Customs,
values, and institutions are, [Burke] suggests, the very tools of the politician's trade, without which nothing can be
achieved except by force and violence. They are not something to be squandered or wantonly destroyed. Not that
we may not change at all, but we must change cautiously and gradually lest we disturb the complex and inscrutable
balance of the parts.").
22. See FROHNEN, supra note 18, at 76-80.
23. Id. at 50 ("The character of a people is determined, not by some metaphysical human nature, but by
particular experiences. History produces a particular set of institutions and prejudices within a given society, and
these institutions and prejudices determine, in large measure, the nature of the people of that society.").
24. Id. at 43-44.
25. See RJ. Vincent, Edmund Burke and the Theory ofinternational Relations, 10 REvIEW INT'L STUDIES
205,209 (1984).
The truth was that France, that is the robbers in possession, had gone beyond the principles of the law
of nations, 'the great ligament of mankind,' to challenge the very structure of European society. They
had constructed their republic on three principles fundamentally opposed to those on which all other
European communities were built. It was based on Regicide, Jacobinism, and Atheism.
Id.
26. Indeed, in his thought on empire, one might see Burke as a practitioner of what Harold Berman has
called "integrative jurisprudence." See generally Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics,
Morality, History, 76 CAL. L. REV. 779 (1988) (noting that the requirement to respect chartered rights and
traditional patterns of dealing corresponds to Berman's demand to observe historical precedent; the preservation
of the structure of the British Constitution corresponds to Berman's politics and policy; and the observance of the
teachings of the natural law corresponds to Berman's requirement that law have a moral character).
27. See FRANCiS CANAVAN, THE POLiTICAL ECONOMY OFEDMUND BuRKE: THE ROLE OF PROPERTY IN His
THOUrHT (1995).
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aristocrats, but of the people at large, whose trustees the aristocrats are. In
Canavan's view, English overlords were to their foreign subjects what English
aristocrats were to English commoners.2 9 In both cases those with power and
property were duty-bound to use their advantages for the benefit of the
disadvantaged.
As proof of Burke's commitment to colonial trusteeship Canavan cites his
indictment of Indian governor-general Warren Hastings for abuse of his charges:
"'When a British governour is sent abroad, he is sent to pursue the good of the
people as much as possible in the spirit of the laws of [England], which in all
respects intend their conservation, their happiness, and their prosperity.'" 0
But this sort of language also shows the limits of a mode of analysis in which
Burke's theory of empire is seen as a matter of trusteeship. Trusteeship should not
be understood as a general and overarching philosophical principle that can explain
all of Burke's thought on empire. Rather, to the extent one may talk about trusteeship
at all, it is preferable to see it as arising out of a legally binding set of obligations,
much like the doctrine of trust found at common law.3' It is the result of past practice
as well as mutual agreement and consent memorialized in charters that enumerate the
rights and obligations of all concerned. Where such agreement is lacking, Burke
would not impute it. Indeed, it is preferable to substitute for the word "trusteeship,"
the term "chartered rights."
And if the particular features of a chartered relationship are the product of a
settled course of dealings and mutual consent, the relationship itself also rests on
firmer ground than mere contract or convention. As Frederick Whelan has observed,
the "general duty implicit in the idea of government as a trust, the duty of rulers to
promote the well-being of those under their authority... [is] derived from natural
law." 32 As well, there must be a bond of affection uniting the governor and the
governed. Where affection and loyalty has died, the continuance of the relationship
itself is called into doubt.33
28. Id. at 40.
29. Id. at 40-41.
30. lId at 40 (quoting Burke). Burke continues: "God forbid it should be bruited from Peking to Paris, that
the Laws of England are for the rich and the powerful; but to the poor, the miserable, the defenceless, they afford
no resource at all." Id. (quoting Burke).
31. Idat39-41.
32. See WHELAN, supra note 3, at 280.
33. As an aside, Canavan makes the interesting point that trusteeship was of limited use in Ireland because
the English rulers had an insufficient common bond of affection with the local inhabitants and governed the
populace with an eye to their own private interests, rather than the common good. See CANAVAN, supra note 27,
at 41. Cf James Conniff, Burke and India: The Failure of the Theory of Trusteeship, 46 POL. REs. Q. 291 (1993)
(making a similar argument about India). Conniff would like to see the "theory of trusteeship [as] perhaps the
central focus of [Burke's] thought." Id. at 292. This Article, however, demonstrates trusteeship was never more than
one aspect of a larger theory of empire and was carefully circumscribed by qualifications. Conniff is also mistaken
in attempting to read into Burke a modem democratic preoccupation with procedural democracy. He argues that
lack of democratic representation was the key flaw in England's trusteeship over India. Id. at 306-07. But Conniff's
closing paragraph, in which he acknowledges tie need for a commonality of interest and affection as foundational
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The parts of the empire governed by the center must not be seen merely as the
passive beneficiaries of the central authority's solicitude and judgment. They were
their own separate societies and had their own unique interests? Thus the English
should not, in Burke's view, take over any more of their property and rights than was
allowed for by the relevant charters and the necessity to maintain the well-being of
possession and empire.
In addition to chartered rights, Burke looked to the English constitution as
furnishing principles essential to the proper governance of Britain's imperial
possessions. Most fundamentally, he took the constitution as establishing, as a matter
of general principle, that all state power was of limited scope. Nongovernmental
institutions, accordingly, enjoyed a substantial autonomy determined by tradition as
much as by statute.35 Burke advanced the same sort of claim regarding Britain's
overseas possessions-they should enjoy sufficient autonomy (that-is, local power
and authority) to maintain the coherence of their given societies.
At the same time, however, respect for local customs must not degenerate into
exploitation on the basis of alleged cultural inferiority. Burke denounced "geo-
graphical morality"-the belief that "standard practices, institutions, and conduct
vary in the different societies around the world, and that moral judgments can be
made only with reference to the varying cultural norms acknowledged in those
societies. 36 Such a belief allowed rapacious British governors to excuse or
rationalize their conduct by claiming that British constitutional and moral principles
did not apply in their territories.37
Finally, Burke looked to the natural law as a guide to the proper governance of
empire. Not only did the natural law require that the promises made in charters be
kept, it also set standards below which British governors must not fall. This is
particularly evident, for instance, in Burke's treatment of religious persecution in
Ireland, which, he charged, violated fundamental principles of human relationships.3"
Burke's theory of empire, based as it was on chartered rights, the English
to imperial governance, points to a problem deeper than the mechanics of politics, and one to which Burke himself
looked as the key to empire. Id. at 307-08.
34. The same can also be said of England. Assertions that the aristocracy served as trustees for commoners
occupying the position of passive beneficiaries must be balanced with the fact that numerous classes and callings
had their particular rights, privileges, liberties, powers, immunities and responsibilities.
35. STANLIS, supra note 18, at 26. Quoting Burke as stating:
The constitution ... says to an encroaching prerogative, your sceptre has its length, you cannot add a
hair to your head, or a gem to your crown, but what an eternal law has given to it. Here it says to an
overweening peerage,-your pride finds banks that it cannot overflow: here to a tumultuous and giddy
people,--there is a bound to the raging sea. Our constitution is like our island, which uses and restrains
its subject sea; in vain the waves roar. In that constitution I know, and exultingly feel, both that I am
free, and that I am not free dangerously to myself or to others. I know that no power on earth, acting as
I ought to do, can touch my life, my liberty, or my property.
Id.
36. See WHELAN, supra note 3, at 281.
37. Id.
38. See infra notes 99-163 and accompanying text.
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constitution, and fundamental precepts of the natural law, was intended to stand as
a bulwark against the exploitation that all too easily could occur in the conduct of
imperial governance.3 9
It must finally be stressed that these principles were not the result of abstract
theorizing carried on at some remove from public affairs. Rather they were forged
in the heat of political controversy as Burke the parliamentarian sought to develop
principled responses to the great conflicts of the day-the proper governance of
India, Ireland, and the American colonies. Ever sensitive to the needs and
contingencies shaping particular societies, Burke fashioned a unique response to each
of these great imperial controversies. This Article will consider the ways in which
Burke developed and articulated his response to the problems of empire.
I. INDIA: ARGUING FOR SYMPATHY TOWARD A FOREIGN PEOPLE
Britain's rule in India was of a very peculiar sort: It had its origin not with state
conquest or official policy, but with the steady increase in the trading activities of the
East India Company.' Founded by London merchants in the late 1590s to organize
and promote trade with the "East Indies," the Company received a royal charter and
was given a monopoly over trade routes in 1600.4" Trade and investment policy and
practice with the east remained in private hands through the end of the eighteenth
century and beyond. This is not to say that the English state played no role in the
activities of the Company; rather, the assistance it provided was of an indirect nature.
It supported the Company's monopoly status against traders who challenged it in the
royal courts and provided naval reinforcements when the occasion required it, while
39. Language in Burke's time was rather imprecise concerning just what constituted a people, or a country
for that matter. Burke, for instance, refers to the "countries" of Staten Island and Long Island. See Letter to the
Sheriffs of Bristol on the Affairs of America, I WORKS 18. It seems clear that Burke differentiated among groups
according to their ancestry and circumstances. Even the colonial children of England had developed a separate
character over the 150 years since landing in the New World. The inhabitants of England's possessions in India had
their own, vastly different but ancient and respectable civilization. Ireland's people shared a civil establishment with
the English, one in which Burke-being of Irish stock-was a prominent figure. For a more complete discussion
of Anglo-American usage of the terms "people" and "country," see BRUCE P. FROHNEN, THE NEw COM-
MUNITARIANS AND THE CRISIS OF MODERN LIBERALISM 217-18 (1996).
40. Burke himself took note of the unusual circumstances by which Britain came to rule in India:
A new disposition took place, not dreamt of in the theories of the speculative politicians, and of which
few examples in the least resembling it have been seen in the modem world, none at all in the ancient.
In other instances, a political body that acts as a commonwealth was first settled, and trade followed as
a consequence of the protection obtained by political power, but here the course of affairs was reversed.
The constitution of the Company began in commerce and ended in empire.
Speech in Opening the Impeachment of Warren Hastings, IX THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE
329,349 (1901).
41. See PlnjP LAWSON, THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: A HISTORY 1-17 (1993) (explaining the founding of
the English East India Company); BRIAN GARDNER, THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: A HISTORY 17-32 (1971) (same).
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the Company established permanent enclaves in India in the latter half of the
seventeenth century.42
By the 1690s, it had become apparent "to even the most cynical [members of
Parliament]" 43 that the East India Company had used various corrupt practices to
retain its favored status. Parliament attempted by statute to create a new Company
with trading privileges to the East, an effort that was effectively frustrated when the
old Company purchased nearly twenty percent of stock in the new venture and used
its controlling position to "undermine[] the new Company from within."44 The two
companies eventually merged in 1709.
Sharp dealing such as this continued to characterize the operation of the
Company throughout the eighteenth century, both in its activities in India and in
Britain. In India, the Company established trading centers, called "presidencies," in
Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta.45 It soon enjoyed phenomenal success, attributable
to its ability to "exploit[] all the opportunities offered to its traders."''  Lawson
cautions his readers to avoid the "simplistic explanation" that would see the
Company's activities as singularly "rapacious." 47 While such an admonition is
certainly in order, Lawson also provides evidence suggesting that corruption was a
steady feature of Company practice at this early date.45
As the eighteenth century progressed, the Company established itself not only
as an economic, but as a political force to be reckoned with on the Indian sub-
continent. In the 1740s, '50s, and '60s, the Company fought a series of wars with
French trading outposts in India, as well as with various native Bengali
principalities.49 At the close of these adventures, the Company found itself deeply
42. See LAWSON, supra note 41, at 45 (discussing litigation challenging the Company's monopoly status);
id. at 46-47 (discussing the use of naval power to support the Company's trading posts). See also JOHN KEAY, THE
HONOURABLE COMPANY: A HISTORY OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY 130-68 (1991) (discussing the Company's
aggressive expansion at the close of the seventeenth century).
43. See LAWSON, supra note 41, at 54.
44. Id. at 55.
45. Id. at 66.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 70.
48. Thus Lawson indicates that the employees of the Company had two purposes while in India: "to make
money for the Company and to enrich oneself while doing so." Id. at 72. Lawson continues:
To avoid penury... many [of the Company's employees] supplemented the official wage by indulging
in private trade with Indian merchants in the Company's orbit. In this way the Company employee ran
two businesses: one account covering trade for the East India Company and the other for himself....
The opportunity and, more sinister, temptation to cheat in such circumstances became manifest. In
consequence, whole illicit networks of credit, debt, and deceit evolved wherever Company interests
overlapped with private trading enterprises.
ld. at 72-73. Cf. PJ. MARSHALL, EAST INDIAN FORTUNES: THE BRITISH IN BENGAL IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
158-79 (1976) (detailing means by which private wealth was accumulated).
49. See LAWSON, supra note 41, at 86-102; see also GARDNER, supra note 41, at 53-92. More than anyone
else, the man responsible for this expansion of the Company's aims was Robert Clive, one of the most controversial
figures of the eighteenth century and one of the most romanticized of the nineteenth. Of Clive, Macaulay wrote:
1997/Diversity In Western Constitutionalism
enmeshed in the political system of India, the recipient of various favors and offices
from local leaders and the chief guarantor of political stability.5° In 1765, Sir Robert
Clive took the logical step of collecting taxes directly from the native population and
using the funds "to support the administration in Bengal."5'
The emergence of the Company as a political force in Bengal demanded that it
also become an ever more vigorous political presence in Britain. From at least the
1760s, one finds that a substantial percentage of members of Parliament were also
shareholders in the East India Company,52 and one finds as well the growth of a
dense network of close relationships between the Company and parliamentarians and
those aspiring to office.53 Indeed, it can fairly be said that "the Company had become
involved in the initial stages of a relationship in which divorce ceased to be an option
"54
This, then, forms the backdrop to Burke's writings on India. Burke himself
studied and wrote on the problem for the better part of two decades. While his
thought on the subject changed substantially over time, probably his two most
important statements on the proper response England should take to its newly
acquired Indian empire are his speech on Fox's East India Bill, and the speeches he
prepared on the occasion of the impeachment of Warren Hastings, the governor-
Clive committed great faults .... But his faults, when weighed against his merits, and viewed in
connection with his temptations, do not appear to us to deprive him of his right to an honorable place
in the estimation of posterity. From his first visit to India dates the renown of the English arms in the
East. Till he appeared, his countrymen were despised as mere pedlars, while the French were revered
as a people formed for victory and command. His courage and capacity dissolved the charm.
See MAcAULAY'sEssAyoNLOD CLwVE 126 (Vida D. Scudder ed., 1889). For a more recent, and more balanced
presentation of Clive's life, see NBAD C. CHAUDHURI, CLtVE OF INDIA: A POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ESSAY
(1975).
50. See LAWSON, supra note 41, at 103 ("Where commerce had once reigned supreme there now appeared
territorial and political power in India with all its vexed responsibilities for the Company. Indeed, the East India
Company became nothing less than the defacto ruler of the wealthiest area of the subcontinent-Bengal.").
51. Id. at 106.
52. See H.V. BOWEN, REV ANDREFORM: THEINDIANPRoaLEmiNBRMSHPOLMCS, 1757-1773 (1991)
[hereinafter BOWEN, REVENUE AND REFORM].
Many MPs [members of Parliament] did have close political or financial links with the East India
Company. Some 23 per cent of all the members of the 1768 Parliament owned Company stock at one
time or another between 1764 and 1774, and there were, on average, 118 sitting Members holding stock
at any given time between 1168 and 1774. This strong financial connection between parliamentarians
and the East India Company also manifested itself in the upper House where thirty-four peers owned
stock between 1764 and 1774."
Cf. H.V. Bowen, 'Dipped in the Traffic:' East India Stockholders in the House of Commons, 1759.1774, 5
PARLIAIENTARY HIST. 39 (1986) (providing further details on parliamentary stockholding).
53. See LUCY S. SuTHERLAND, THE EAST INDIA COMPANY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY POLITICS (1952). See
also BOwEN, REvENuE AND REFORM, supra note 52, at 41-42 (discussing the use of the East India Company by
aspiring politicians).
54. See LAWSON, supra note 41, at 96.
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general of Bengal. 5 These speeches, prepared for momentous events of the day,
reflect his mature and considered judgment on the matter.
Fox's East India bill was first proposed in December, 1783, and "stands out as
a relatively radical legislative proposal, which would have effectively transferred
authority over British India, both political and commercial, from the company to
commissioners who were members of Parliament and directly responsible to that
legislative body. 5 6 Burke's defense of this bill-which was eventually defeated-
amounts to a sustained indictment of East India Company practices and a program
for the coexistence of Indian and British interests. It represents a specific application
of the major aspects of his thought on empire-the appropriate respect due chartered
rights, the principles of the English constitution, and the dictates of natural law-to
the intensely practical matter of the governance of British India.
Burke commenced his speech by addressing an important problem: The East
India Company acted as it had on the basis of a charter granted to it by the Crown.
The charter conferred on the Company certain rights that have been "bought for
money, for money honestly and fairly paid." 57 The rights were further secured to the
Company "by every sort of public sanction. They are stamped by the faith of the
king; they are stamped by the faith of parliament... ,,5 But, Burke continues, these
rights carried with them certain obligations:
Those who carry the rights and claims of the Company the furthest do not
contend for more than this; and all this I freely grant. But granting all this,
they must grant to me in my turn that all political power which is set over
men, and that all privilege claimed or exercised in exclusion of them, being
55. This is not, however, to overlook the importance of Burke's speech on the Nabob of Arcot's debts.
Delivered in 1785, this speech exposed the corrupt influence agents of the East India Company acquired over
Muhammad Ali Khan, the nawab of the Carnatic. Frederick Whelan has described the condition of Company rule
in the Carnatic:
A group of company servants ... began to lend large sums of money to the irresponsible or inept nawab
at exorbitant interest rates, and these debts (running eventually into the millions of pounds) were secured
by mortgages on the future public revenues of the Carnatic. As the nawab fell ever more deeply in
arrears, his regime fell under the sway of his creditors. At the same time, these individuals acquired a
strong interest in the continuing viability and solvency of the nawab's government, from which they
were extracting immense fortunes, and they exerted considerable influence to ensure that the company's
official policies toward its ally were consistent with their private interest. The nawab was willing to keep
on borrowing at high interest, and the creditors were willing to lend, because both were confident that
the company, and perhaps ultimately the British government, would bail them out at the end.
In Burke's view, the collusive relations among the nawab, his British creditors, and the East India
Company (which permitted or, as Burke saw it, connived at the financial dealings, since the private
loans permitted the nawab to repay debts he owed to the company) amounted to a massive corrupt
scheme for the profit of speculators, a scheme that had detrimental, in fact nearly disastrous,
consequences both for the people of the region and for the public interest of the British Empire.
See WHFE.AN, supra note 3. at 109-10.
56. Id. at44.
57. Speech on Mr. Fox's East India Bill, I THE WORKS OF EDMUND BuRKE 332 (1837).
58. Id.
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wholly artificial, and for so much a derogation from the natural equality of
mankind at large, ought to be some way or other exercised ultimately for
their benefit5 9
It is in this respect that the East India Company failed to execute its part of the
bargain. In a sense, Burke argues, the Company broke its faith not only with Parlia-
ment, but with the Indian people. And having broken faith, the Company forfeited
its prerogatives. 60
A large part of Burke's speech is taken up with documenting the many ways in
which the Company broke its faith and forfeited its contractual rights. The Great
Mogul, one of the hereditary princes of India, who had conferred important
privileges on the East India Company, found himself and his territory "sold." "The
descendant of Tamerlane now stands in need almost of the common necessaries of
life., 61 The nation of the Rohillas found itself similarly sold to a foreign prince, and,
when their leader resisted, British officers participated in the armed reduction of the
country. 62 The ruler Fizullah Khan had his territory extorted from him through a
fraudulent legal process.63
Where the Company established its rule, tyranny and despotism soon followed.
Originally a trading concern, the Company had set up a government based on
bribery, which ruled every aspect of Indians' lives for its own benefit. And its
government had become as corrupt as its business dealings. 64 Where the Company
had its way, the traditional Indian legal system was abolished, replaced by an
59. Id.
60. Id. ("[I]f the abuse is proved, the contract is broken...."). Burke also observed that the Company
governed India in trust, but that its powers as trustee were derivative from Parliament. Upon forfeiture of its rights,
Parliament, as ultimate trustee, was obliged to intervene. Id.
61. Id. at 335.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 343-44.
64. See id. at 350 (discussing the corrupt dealings agents of the Company had with the Nawab (or "nabob")
of the Carnatic, Burke outlines the Company's wholesale destruction of ordered society:
[Under the] new system [] it was their policy to consider hoards of money as crimes; to regard moderate
rents as frauds on'the sovereign; and to view, in the lesser princes, any claim of exemption from more
than settled tribute, as act of rebellion. Accordingly, all the castles were, one after the other, plundered
and destroyed. The native princes were expelled; the hospitals fell to ruin; the reservoirs of water went
to decay; the merchants, bankers, and manufacturers disappeared; and sterility, indigence, and
depopulation overspread the face of these once flourishing provinces.
Id.
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arrogant and arbitrary cleptocracy.6 s Summarizing these findings, Burke observed
that "the Company never has made a treaty which they have not broken. ' "
Having established to his satisfaction the deplorable nature of Company rule,
Burke raised the question of simply withdrawing altogether. Such an action,
however, seemed impossible: "[T]here we are; there we are placed by the Sovereign
Disposer; and we must do the best we can in our situation. The situation of man is
the preceptor of his duty." 67 If duty thus required that the fates of Britain and India
be joined, how might the nation respond?
The first step that must be taken is to recognize the depth and quality of Indian
civilization. Burke understood that it may be difficult to generate sympathy in Britain
for the Indian people: "[The very names of the sufferers are so uncouth and strange
to our ears, that it is very difficult for our sympathy to fix upon these objects.'6 But
if one took the time to learn about India, one would quickly notice that the Indians
had a great civilization that deserved the respect of outsiders:
This multitude of men does not consist of an abject and barbarous populace
... but a people for ages civilized and cultivated; cultivated by all the arts
of polished life, whilst we were yet in the woods. There, have been (and still
the skeletons remain) princes once of great dignity, authority, and opulence.
There, are to be found the chiefs of tribes and nations. There, is to be found
an ancient and venerable priesthood, the depository of their laws, learning
and history, the guides of the people whilst living, and their consolation in
65. Id. at 354.
In effect... every legal regular authority in matters of revenue, of political administration, of criminal
law, of civil law, in many of the most essential parts of military discipline, is laid level with the ground;
and an oppressive, irregular, capricious, unsteady, rapacious, and peculating despotism, with a direct
disavowal of obedience to any authority at home, and without any fixed maxim, principle, or rule of
proceeding to guide them in India, is at present the state of your charter-government over great
kingdoms.
Id.
66. l. at 336. At one point Burke asserted that English rule in India had been more devastating to the local
inhabitants than the conquests of the Tartars:
The Tartar invasion was mischievous; but it is our protection that destroys India. It was their enmity,
but it is our friendship. Our conquest there, after twenty years, is as crude as it was the first day ....
Every rupee of profit made by an Englishman is lost forever to India. With us are no retributory
superstitions, by which a foundation of charity compensates, through ages, to the poor, for the rapine
and injustice of a day. With us, no pride erects stately monuments which repair the mischief which pride
had produced, and which adorn a country out of its own spoils. England has erected no churches, no
hospitals, no palaces, no schools; England has built no bridges, made no high roads, cut no navigations,
dug out no reservoirs. Every other conqueror of every other description has left some monument, either
of state or beneficence, behind him. Were we to be driven out of India this day, nothing would remain,
to tell that it had been possessed, during the inglorious period of our dominion, by anything better than
the ourangoutang or the tiger.
Id. at 340.
67. Id. at 341.
68. Id.
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death; a nobility of great antiquity and renown; a multitude of cities not
exceeded in population and trade by those of the first class in Europe;
merchants and bankers, individual houses of whom have once vied in capital
with the bank of England;... millions of ingenious manufacturers and
mechanics; millions of the most diligent and not the least intelligent, tillers
of the earth. Here are to be found almost all the religions professed by man,
the Braminical, the Musselman, the Eastern and the Western Christian69
The second step, then, is to develop means of protecting both British and Indian
interests. The proper vehicle for this development, Burke continues, are the
principles of the British Constitution. The charter by which the East India Company
held claim to India should be replaced by the Magna Carta, the Great Charter of
English liberties. Indeed, Fox's Bill was "intended to form the Magna Charta of
Hindostan."7 ° In this way, fundamental natural rights would be secured in the English
tradition-through recognition by charter. The "natural rights of mankind" are thus
69. See id. at 334. Comparing India to Germany:
The nabob of Oude might stand for the king of Prussia; the nabob of Arcot I would compare as superior
in territory, and equal in revenue to the elector of Saxony. Cheyt Singh, the rajah of Benares, might well
rank with the prince of Hesse, at least; and the rajah of Tanjore... to the elector of Bavaria. The
Polygars and the northern Zemindars, and other great chiefs, might well class with the rest of the
princes, dukes, counts, marquisses, and bishops in the empire.
Id.
70. Id. at 333. Burke continued: "Whatever the treaty of Westphalia is to the liberty and freedom of the
princes and free cities of the empire, and to the three religions there professed-Whatever the great charter, the
statute of tallage, the petition of right, and the declaration of right, are to Great Britain, these bills are to the people
of India." Id.
40
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transformed into "the chartered rights of men."' Parliament, by the terms of Fox's
Bill, would stand as the guarantor of such rights.
Burke continued his campaign for fair treatment for India even after the defeat
of Fox's Bill, his struggle culminating in another failed exertion-the seven-year
impeachment trial of Warren Hastings for misconduct during his tenure as British
governor-general of Bengal.
Many of the abuses attacked in the speech on Fox's East India Bill occurred
during Warren Hastings's tenure as governor-general and would subsequently form
the core of many of the charges Burke brought against the man who served as the
chief representative of Company interests in India from 1772 to 1785. The office of
governor-general had been created in 1773 by Lord North's Regulating Act, which
went on to set requirements for proper performance in office and to name Hastings
explicitly to the position.' I Impeachment, under British law, amounted to "a charge
by the Commons of violations of 'the already known and existing law,' tried before
the Lords as 'the most high and supreme court of criminal jurisdiction."' 73 By virtue
71. Id. at 331. It must be noted that Burke was no advocate of an abstract conception of rights, immediately
knowable without regard to social circumstances or historical development. See REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION
IN FRANCE 67 (Thomas H.D. Mahoney ed., 1955). Contrasting the true and false rights of men:
If civil society be made for the advantage of man, all the advantages for which it is made become his
right. It is an institution of beneficence; and law itself is only beneficence acting by a rule. Men have
a right to live by that rule; they have a right to do justice, as between their fellows, whether their fellows
are in public function or in ordinary occupation. They have a right to the fruits of their industry and to
the means of making their industry fruitful. They have a right to the acquisitions of their parents, to the
nourishment and improvement of their offspring, to instruction in life, and to consolation in death.
Whatever each man can separately do, without trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for himself;
and he has a right to a fair portion of all which society, with all its combination of skill and force, can
do in his favor. In this partnership all men have equal rights, but not to equal things.
Id. These rights, Burke notes, are the product of "convention," the rules and customs developed through the
experience of living in the community for a long passage of time. Id. at 67-68. The revolutionaries, however, wished
to substitute for experience abstract principles:
They despise experience as the wisdom of unlettered men; and as for the rest, they have wrought
underground a mine that will blow up, at one grand explosion, all examples of antiquity, all precedents,
charters, .and acts of parliament. They have 'the rights of men.' Against these there can be no
prescription, against these no agreement is binding; these admit no temperament and no compromise;
anything withheld from their full demand is so much of fraud and injustice. Against these rights of men
let no government look for security in the length of its continuance, or in the justice and lenity of its
administration.
Id. at 66. The very abstractness of these rights was their signal failing: "[Tiheir abstract perfection is their practical
defect. By having a right to everything they want everything." Id. at 68.
See also J.G.A. Pocock, Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History of Ideas, in J.G.A.
POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE, AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 202, 207 (1971)
(analyzing Burke on rights).
72. See An Actfor Establishing Certain Regulations for the Better Management of the Affairs of the East
India Company, as well in India as in Europe, 13 Gee. Ell 63 (1773). Cf. JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBES 395, 761-62 &
n.14 (1984) (analyzing the statute).
73. See NOONAN, supra note 72, at 397 (quoting WILAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND (1984)).
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of his statutory appointment, "Hastings was open to impeachment." 74 The proceeding
brought against him was comprehensive in scope, including twenty-two articles
naming every sort of abuse of power.75
Our interest in studying the impeachment proceeding is less in its details than in
the general principles Burke articulated as governing the relationship between India
and Britain. Again, Burke began with the proposition that Indian civilization was
ancient and great and deserving of respect. Its legal system is older and more
illustrious than that of the British.76 Indian law possesses great stability and is a force
for moral order in that country. 7 In this context, Burke had no difficulty in asserting
that "their morality is equal to ours." 78
The obligation to respect Indian civilization, however, rested on more than a
simple moral duty to respect an ancient legal and moral order. It was an integral part
of the authority by which the Company acted in India. The Company governed India
in virtue of power derived from two sources-its royal charter of incorporation and
a variety of chartered rights conferred upon it by the Mogul government of Bengal.
Under Hastings's management, it succeeded in violating the terms of both. The
Company's royal charter rendered its officers liable to prosecution under English law
for misconduct in office.7 9 But the charters granted to the Company by the Mogul
emperor conferred on certain of its officers the powers of "lord high steward" under
74. Id.
75. See PJ. MARSHALL,THEIMPEACHmENTOFWARRENHATINGSXiV-XV (1965) (summarizing the Articles
of Impeachment). The Articles are set out in detail in VIII TiE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OFEDMUND BusKE 307-
486 (1901); IX THE WRITINGS AND SPECHES OFEDMUND BURKE 1-325 (1901).
76. "My Lords, these Gentoo people are the original people ofHindostan .... God forbid that we should
pass judgment upon people who framed their laws and institutions prior to our insect origins of yesterday!" Speech
in Opening-First Day, IX WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OFEDMUND BURKE 382 (1901).
77. Burke argued that the source of Indian legal stability lay in the antiquity of its laws:
Their stability has been proved by their holding on an uniform tenor for a duration commensurate to all
the empires with which history has made us acquainted; and they still exist in a green old age, with all
the reverence of antiquity, and with all the passion that people have to novelty and change. They have
stood firm on their ancient base; they have cast their roots deep in their native soil,-perhaps because
they have never spread them anywhere else than in their native soil.
ME at 382-83. The Indian moral order, Burke continues, is the product of the close congruence of law and religious
belief:
The second consideration in the Gentoo institutions is their beneficial effects, moral and civil. The
policy, civil or religious, or, as theirs is, composed of both, that makes a people happy and a state
flourishing... must undoubtedly, so far as human considerations prevail, be a policy wisely conceived
in any scheme of government. It is confirmed by all observation, that, where the Hindoo religion has
been established, that country has been flourishing.
Id. at 383-384.
78. Speech in Opening-Second Day, IX WRrrINGS AND SPEECHES 476 (1901). Burke continued: "I
challenge the world to show in any modem European book more true morality and wisdom than is to be found in
the writings of Asiatic men in high trust, and who have been counsellors to princes." Id.
79. Speech in Opening-First Day, supra note 76, at 346 ("As [the Company's powers] have emanated from
the supreme power of this kingdom, the whole body and the whole train of their servants, the corporate body as a
corporate body, individuals as individuals, are responsible to the high justice of this kingdom.").
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Indian law and obliged them additionally to respect local customs.80 This source of
authority, in turn, obliged the British government to serve as the guarantor of Indian
law and custom:
When the Company acquired that high office in India, an English cor-
poration became an integral part of the Mogul Empire. When Great Britain
virtually assented to that grant of office, and afterwards took advantage of
it, Great Britain guarantied the performance of all its duties. Great Britain
entered into a virtual act of union with that country, by which we bound
ourselves as securities to preserve the people in all the rights, laws, and
liberties which their natural, original sovereign was bound to support, if he
had been in condition to support them. By the disposition of events, the two
duties, flowing from two different sources, are now united in one.81
The British nation had thus become the guarantor of Indian law and liberty. How
should it act? Burke looked to the British Constitution and British law for guidance.
Burke's conception of the Constitution, furthermore, is a dynamic one, emphasizing
the necessity of governing for the benefit of the people governed. As Burke put it,
"My Lords, to obtain empire is common; to govern it well has been rare indeed. To
chastise the guilt of those who have been instruments of imperial sway over other
nations by the high superintending justice of the sovereign state has not many
striking examples among any people. 82 Such, however, might have been expected
of Great Britain, a "free country" that enjoyed "the full benefit of the vital principle
of the British liberty and Constitution .... , It was Britain's obligation to "shed
down the sweet influences of order, peace, science, and security to the natives of that
vexed and harassed country[.]J " Had they done so, "we should have been covered
with genuine honor. It would have been a beautiful and noble spectacle to
mankind. ' '8s
80. Id. at 346-47.
[Bly the Mogul charter of 1765 [the Company] obtained the dewanny, that is, the office of lord high-
steward, of the kingdoms of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa. By that charter they bound themselves (and
bound inclusively all their servants) to perform all the duties belonging to that new office, and to be held
by all the ties belonging to that new relation. If the Mogul empire had existed in its vigor, they would
have been bound, under that responsibility, to observe the laws, rights, usages, and customs of the
natives, and to pursue their benefit in all things: for this duty was inherent in the nature, institution, and
purpose of the office which they received.
Id.
81. Id. at 347; see id. (explaining that the people of India might therefore press their claims before Parlia-
ment as of right: "The people of India, therefore, come in the name of the Commons of Great Britain, but in their
own right, to the bar of this House, before the supreme royal justices of this kingdom, from whence originally all
the powers under which they have suffered were derived.").
82. Speech in Opening-Second Day, supra note 78, at 398.
83. Id. at 399.
84. Id. at 398.
85. Id.
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In the particular circumstances of India, furthermore, Burke asserts, the
"municipal forms" of the British Constitution were not "communicable," even
though "the liberty and spirit of the... Constitution" might be. 6 The Indian people,
especially the upper classes, were quite insulated from outsiders, bound as they were
by strict rules of caste. 7 Thus:
If we undertake to govern the inhabitants of such a country, we must govern
them upon their own principles, and maxims, and not upon ours. We must
not think to force them into the narrow circle of our ideas; we must extend
ours to take in their systems of opinions and rites, and the necessities which
result from both: all change on their part is absolutely impracticable. We
have more versatility of character and manners, and it is we who must
conform.88
Respect for Indian ways, however, did not amount to cultural relativism or the
sanctioning of arbitrary authority. Burke goes to extraordinary lengths to refute the
contemporary common belief that all Eastern forms of government were "arbitrary"
and "despotic." This was the position Hastings relied upon to justify his own
arbitrary rule, 9 and Burke would have none of it. He here put to good use the
classically medieval belief that all political power was derived, either immediately
or indirectly, from God. Since God is the source of all political authority, it is not
possible to govern legitimately as a despot:
Every good gift is of God; all power from whom alone it originates, will
never suffer the exercise of it to be practiced upon any less solid foundation
than the power itself. If, then, all dominion of man over man is the effect of
86. Id. at 399.
87. Speech in Opening-First Day, supra note 76, at 378.
88. itL at 378-79. This is also essentially the point of Burke's argument that it ought to be the spirit and not
the form of British law that should be used in governing India:
My Lords, we contend that Mr. Hasings,.as a British governor, ought to govern on British principles,
not by British forms-God forbid!-for if ever there was a case in which the letter kills and the spirit
gives life, it would be an attempt to introduce British forms and the substance of despotic principles
together into any country. No!
Id. at 447.
89. Speech in Opening-Second Day, supra note 78, at 448.
Mr. Hastings comes before your Lordships ... [and] says: 'I had an arbitrary power to exercise: I
exercised it. Slaves I found the people: slaves they are,---they are so by their constitution; and if they
are, I did not make it for them. I was unfortunately bound to exercise this arbitrary power, and
accordingly I did exercise it. It was disagreeable to me, but I did exercise it; and no other power can be
exercised in that country.'
Id.
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the Divine disposition, it is bound by the eternal laws of Him that gave it,
with which no human authority can dispense .... 90
Burke subsequently expended enormous energy to establish, to his own and his
listeners' apparent satisfaction, that Eastern forms of government were not despotic. 91
"Law and arbitrary power," as Burke phrased it, "are in eternal enmity." Quite
opposite Hastings's reasoning, Burke argued that, the fewer the rights traditionally
possessed by a subject people, the more carefully they ought to be governed. 3
What is important for our purposes is that Hastings's every line of defense was
by now shattered. He was required by charter with the Great Mogul to govern in
accord with Indian principles, and the name of the British government was invoked
as guarantor. Hastings could not rely on the claim that his conduct was in keeping
with principles of responsible government, nor could he claim that by acting
despotically he was simply behaving in accord with Indian constitutional principles.
All power was of God, and God's gift could not be perverted into despotic rule.
Burke sought to "waken something of sympathy for the unfortunate natives" of
India. He sought this sympathy, not because he wanted to give Indians stricter
government, but because he wanted to protect them from a plundering tyrant in the
form of a trading company. England should accept the region's pre-existing religions
and cultures. It should grant greater autonomy to local native officials so that they
could protect Indian civilization. It must as well protect the people from the
rapaciousness of its creature, the East India Company.9' Only a more distant, lenient,
90. Id. at 456 (calling attention to the grounding of Burke's political morality in natural law). See GERALD
W. CHAPMAN, EDMUND BURKE: THE PRACnCAL IMAGINATION 273 (1967) (citing Burke's assertion of "'one great,
immutable, pre-existent law, prior to all our devices, and prior to all our contrivances, paramount to all our ideas
and all our sensations, antecedent to our very existence, by which we are knit and connected in the eternal frame
of the universe, out of which we cannot stir."'). Natural law, as Burke understood it, is not an exclusively Christian
phenomenon; all religions join in teaching a common basic morality-to treat others with respect. As Chapman
characterizes it, "this cosmic and existential responsibility binds every man to every man (and to God) and imposes
commensurate duty upon every power conventionalized by society in functions, rights, and privileges." Id.
91. See Speech in Opening-Second Day, supra note 78, at 463 ("I do challenge the whole race of men to
show me any of the Oriental governors claiming to themselves a right to act by arbitrary will."); see also id. at 463-
76 (opining that Islamic and Hindu principles of government, properly administered, are not "oppressive").
92. Id. at 458.
93. See Ninth Report of the Select Committee on the Affairs of India, VIII WRINGS AND SPEECHES 173-74
("[R]uling over a people guarded by no distinct or well-ascertained privileges, whose language, manners, and
radical prejudices render not only redress, but all complaint on their part, a matter of extreme difficulty,--such an
administration, it is evident, never can be made subservient to the interests of Great Britain, or even tolerable to the
natives, but by the strictest rigor in exacting obedience to the commands of the authority set over it.").
94. Speech on the Nabob ofArcot's Debts, I WORKS OFEDMUND BURKE 414-15 (1837).
It is difficult for the most wise and upright government to correct the abuses of remote delegated power,
productive of unmeasured wealth, and protected by the boldness and strength of the same ill-got riches.
These abuses, full of their own wild native vigour, will grow and flourish under mere neglect. But where
the supreme authority, not content with winking at the rapacity of its inferior instruments, is so
shameless and corrupt as openly to give bounties and premiums for disobedience to its laws; when it
will not trust to the activity of avarice in the pursuit of its own gains; when it secures public robbery by
all the careful jealousy and attention with which it ought to protect property from such violence; the
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and generous empire could prevent the destruction of the great civilization it was
charged with keeping safe.
Hastings was ultimately acquitted, although the proceedings left him "a ruined
man."95 He had spent lavishly on his defense, and had also laid out "great sums" in
buying favorable newspaper and pamphlet coverage.96 He would subsequently regain
his reputation, however, and died in 1818, full of years and honors. 97 Burke, for his
part, found himself censured by the House of Lords in 1789 for "the asperity and
indecency of some expressions which he had used" during the impeachment
proceedirigs. 5 He had, however, defended the constitutional order and laid out a way
by which Britain and India might live together.
IV. IRELAND: OF ALTARS AND FIRESIDES
Ireland has had a troubled relationship with England since the twelfth century,
although the difficulties grew immeasurably worse during the reign of Henry VIII,
when the English monarch renounced allegiance to the Church of Rome and had
himself declared head of the English Church. At a time when the powers of Church
and State were united in the hands of a single ruler it was dangerous-as the
martyrdoms of St. Thomas More and St. John Fisher attested-to question royal
policy in religion. Indeed,.to do so could quite easily lead to the charge of treason.99
In 1534, Silken Thomas Fitzgerald, son of the Earl of Kildare, taking advantage
of the rupture in the relationship between Henry VIII and the papacy, rebelled, and
called upon the Pope to back him.01 ° Thomas's rebellion was short-lived and unsuc-
cessful,01 but it nevertheless set a pattern for Anglo-Irish relations for much of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: the Irish would remain Catholic, and would use
their loyalty to the Pope both as symbol of their national independence and as a
political card to play in times of national crisis.
°2
commonwealth then is become totally perverted from its purposes; neither God nor man will long
endure it; nor will it long endure itself.
L
95. See MACAULEY'S ESSAY ON WARREN HASTINGS 146 (Joseph Villiers Denny ed., 1907) [hereinafter
MACAULEY'S WARREN HASTINGS].
96. rd. at 147.
97. See NOONAN, supra note 72 at 393 (noting Hastings retirement).
98. See MACAuLEY'S WARREN HASTINGS, supra note 95, at 142.
99. See GEOFFREY ELTON, REFORMANDREFoRMATION: ENGLAND, 1509-1558 174-200 (1977) (describing
the breach with Rome); id. at 193-94 (reporting on the trial of More and Fisher for treason).
100. See RANELAGH, supra note 8, at 46.
101. See RANELAGH, supra note 8, at 46 (noting that Thomas and his co-conspirators were subsequently put
to death at Tybum in 1537).
102. Ranelagh details some of the instances of foreign intervention in Anglo-Irish affairs:
In 1579 Pope Gregory XIII and Philip II of Spain launched an expedition announced as a crusade which
landed at Dingle, Co[unty] Kerry. The following year a papal force landed at Smerwick, Co[unty]
Kerry. In 1601, over 3,000 Spaniards landed at Kinsale, Co[unty] Cork, to help an Irish rebellion. In
1690, Louis XIV of France sent a 7,000 strong army to Cork, which later fought for James II at the
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England's response to Irish intransigence was simultaneously to tighten the legal
bonds that held Ireland to England, and to make life uncomfortable for the Catholic
majority. According to the terms of Poynings' Law, enacted prior to the Reformation
in 1495, the Irish Parliament could only meet upon approval by the English king.
10 3
For most of the next three centuries, Ireland occupied a confused but subordinate
position in British Constitutional thought, as "neither kingdom nor nation."" In
addition to dominating Ireland constitutionally, the English also attempted, beginning
in the early years of the seventeenth century, to transplant English legal institutions,
such as the common-law forms of land-tenure, to Ireland.'05
Life was made difficult for the Irish Catholic majority as well by the develop-
ment of an ideology that stressed their uncivilized and conquered status. With roots
in medieval canonistic teaching,106 this belief system denied that the Irish, as a
subject people lacking the basic ingredients of civilization, could enjoy any of the
meaningful rights of political society. 7 English lawyers and publicists made use of
this ideology as the underlying justification for their attempts to eradicate the vestiges
of native Irish law. 08
Matters grew far more oppressive in the middle and closing decades of the
seventeenth century. In the 1640s and 1650s, Oliver Cromwell embarked upon a
program of confiscating land from the Catholic population and resettling it with
Protestant loyalists. 1' 9 The Glorious Revolution of 1688/89 only worsened
Battle of the Boyne. In 1798 over 4,000 French soldiers landed in Ireland to help another rebellion.
RANELAGH, supra note 8, at 46. at 47.
103. RANELAGH, supra note 8, at 45-46.
104. For a detailed treatment of the constitutional status of Ireland within the British empire, see NEIL
LONGLEY YORK, NEITHER KINGDOM NOR NATION: THE IRISH QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 1698-4800
(1994).
105. See HANS S. PAWLISCH, SIR JOHN DAVIES AND THE CONQUEST OF IRELAND: A STUDY IN LEGAL
IMPERIALISM 55-83 (1985).
106. Id. at 9 (discussing the canonistic origins of this doctrine).
107. See James Muldoon. The Indian as Irishman, 11I ESSEX INST. His. CoLLECTIONS 267, 269 (1975).
As one official wrote.., describing the Irish, they 'wanted neither wit not valour' but they lacked the
basic institutions and skills of civilized people. They 'did neuer builde any houses of Bricke or stone
(some few poor Religious Houses excepted)' before Henry II's invasion in 1170. Furthermore they did
not 'plant any Gardens or Orchards, Inclose or improve their lands, liue together in setled Villages or
Townes, nor made any prouision for posterity.' In a word their whole way of life was 'against all sense
and reason.'
(quoting SIR JOHN DAVIES, DISCOVERY OF THE TRUE CAUSES WHY IRELAND WAS NEVER ENTIRELY SUBDUED
(1969)). Muldoon's larger point in writing is to argue that this view of the Irish came to be transplanted to the New
World and helped to shape colonists' views of the native population.
108. See PAWLISCH, supra note 105, at 9-10 (writing, concerning Sir John Davies' reliance on this belief
system: "As propounded by Davies, the application of conquest right vested England with a public law title to
Ireland.... Davies invoked the now familiar powers of conquest to justify the eradication of domestic Irish law
as little more than a barbarous and lewd custom, with an eye to eliminating all competing claims to Irish
dominion").
109. See RANELAGH, supra note 8, at 64-65 (revealing that over eleven million acres of land were confiscated
in the 1650s). "In 1685, at the accession of King James II, only 22 per cent of the land of Ireland was owned by
Catholic Irishmen." Id.
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conditions: The British Protestant establishment had rightly concluded that their
monarch, James II, had grown overly sympathetic to Catholicism.
11 James was
deposed as king in January, 1689,111 and subsequently fought a losing battle to regain
his throne.1' The Catholic Irish made the catastrophic decision to support James, and
found themselves militarily crushed at the Battle of the Boyne 
in 1690.1'3
The English response to what they took as treasonous support for James II was
to enact a series of laws, called variously the penal or the popery laws, intended to
eradicate Irish Catholicism itself. These laws had as their twin objects the crippling
of the organized Church and the subjugation of all those who maintained allegiance
to it. In 1697, the Banishment Act declared that "All popish archbishops, bishops,
vicars general, deans, Jesuits, monks, and all other regular clergy and all Papists
exercising regular jurisdiction" were required to leave the realm 
by May, 1698.114
The terms of this Act were given strength with the enactment of legislation in 1709
requiring the immediate gaoling of all diocesan clergy, and offering large rewards to
those turning in such persons."1 While an underground clergy remained active in
Ireland throughout the eighteenth century,1 6 it was subjected to frequent harassment
by the authorities.1
7
A second series of laws aimed at disabling Catholics from participating in the life
of the state. An Act of 1695 prohibited Catholics from owning arms or from
educating their children in their faith either at home or abroad."' The "Popery Act"
of 1704 attacked Catholic landholding, prohibiting Catholics from buying landed
estates, entering long-term leases, or passing their property through primogeniture
to their eldest son." 9 Should a prospective heir turn Protestant, he might take a fee-
simple interest at once, reducing his father's interest to that of a life estate.
120 A
network of informers was set in place by an Act of 1709 to help enforce this
110. See GOLDWIN SMITH, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 365-68 (2d ed., 1957).
111. Id. at 367-68.
112. Id. at 370.
113. Id.
114. 9 Will. I c. 1; cf. MAUREEN WALL, THE PENAL LAWS, 1691-1760: CHURCH AND STATE FROM THE
TREATYOFL1MERICKTOTHEACCESSIONOFGEORGEIII 13-15 (1961) (analyzing this Act).
115. 8 Anne c. 3; cf. WALL, supra note 114, at 23-24. Subsequent legislation declared it a capital crime for
a priest to preside at the marriages of Catholics and Protestants and declared invalid any marriage so performed.
Id. at 24, nl. Another Act declared that any priest found in Ireland after May, 1720, should "be branded with a hot
iron on the cheek, so that he could be easily identified if he returned after banishment." Id. at 26. Other legislation
imposed heavy civil penalties on convents and chapels. Id.
116. See WALL, supra note 114, at 34-42 (addressing the state of the hierarchy under the penal laws); see id.,
at 42-64 (d-scribing the condition of the larger Church); see generally John Brady & Patrick J. Corish, The Church
Under the Penal Code, IV A HISTORY OF IRISH CATHOLICISM, fast. 111-88 (Patrick J. Corish ed., 1971).
117. See, for example, the practice of "priest-hunting" documented by WALL, supra note 114, at 31-33.
118. 7 Will. M, c. 4, c. 5. Cf. J.G. Simms, The Establishment of Protestant Ascendancy, 1691-1714, in A
NEW HISTORY OF IRELAND, vol. IV 1. 16 (T.W. Moody &.W.E. Vaughan eds., 1986) (analyzing the legislation).
119. 2 Anne c. 6; cf. Simms, supra note 118, at 19 (analyzing the statute).
120. Id
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legislation.121 The 1709 Act also decreed that only Catholics who took an Oath of
Abjuration, renouncing allegiance to Rome, could vote in parliamentary elections."
Irish Catholics lost the franchise entirely in 1728.'2
Burke's Tract on the Popery Laws was directed against this network of laws and
policy 1 24 An incomplete work in five parts, the Tract was probably written in 1761,
but was not published until after Burke's death.'25 It was Burke's purpose to establish
that the popery laws were "unjust, impolitic, and inefficacious.' 1 26 To prove this
contention, Burke felt required to examine the nature and function of law itself.
Indeed, he opens his treatise by posing the question, "[W]hether such a system,
respecting such an object, be in reality agreeable to any sound principles of
legislation or any authorized definition of law."' 27 In the course of answering this
question, Burke developed a natural-law argument against the very structure of the
popery laws and argued for the necessity of recreating the bonds of affection that had
been so badly ruptured by English persecution. Only then might Ireland be
incorporated voluntarily into the larger British empire.
Burke begins his case with the premise that all legislation depends upon the
consent of the govemed. 28 The popery laws fail this test. It is obvious at first glance
that the laws are opposed to the beliefs and practices of a majority of Irish men and
women. Burke estimates that at least two-thirds of the Irish population suffer
"penalty and incapacity" as a result of these laws.129 He concludes:
The happiness or misery of multitudes can never be a thing indifferent. A
law against the majority of the people is in substance a law against the
people itself; its extent determines its invalidity; it even changes its character
as it enlarges its operation: it is not particular injustice, but general
oppression; and can no longer be considered as a private hardship, which
might be borne, but spreads and grows up into the unfortunate importance
of a national calamity. 3°
121. 8 Anne c. 3; cf. Simms, supra note 118, at 19-20 (observing that "The effect of the property legislation
was to make a drastic reduction in the area that was still left in catholic ownership at the conclusion of the
Williamite settlement.").
122. See 8 Anne c. 3; cf. Simms, supra note 118, at 21.
123. See Simms, supra note 118, at 21.
124. See VI WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OFEDMUND BURKE. TRAcTONTHE POPERYLAws 299-360 [hereinafter
TRACT].
125. See THoMAs H.D. MAHONEY, EDMUND BURKE AND IRELAND 16, 355-56 (1960) (illustrating the
circumstances surrounding the drafting and publishing of the TRACT).
126. TRAcT, supra note 124, at 318.
127. Id.
128. "[I]n all forms of government the people is [sic] the true legislator, and whether the immediate and
instrumental cause of the law be a single person or many, the remote and efficient cause is the consent of the people,
either actual or implied; and such consent is absolutely essential to its validity:' Id. at 320-21.
129. Id. at 318.
130. Id. at 320.
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But how can one distinguish between a law that is generally oppressive and one
that serves the interest of the people? This question is not easy to answer. The
Protestants, after all, claimed that the popery laws were in the best interests of the
Catholics, since they were thereby being induced to join the true religion and save
their souls. The people, furthermore, "are presumed to consent to whatever the
legislature ordains for their benefit; and they are to acquiesce in it, though they do
not clearly see the propriety of the means by which they are conducted to that
desirable end. This they owe as an act of homage to and just deference to the reason
which necessity of government has made superior to their own.1 31
Burke's first response to this question was simply to assert that it is obvious to
all that the Irish were being harmed by the popery laws:
But though the means, and indeed the nature, of a public advantage may not
always be evident to the understanding of the subject, no one is so gross and
stupid as not to distinguish between a benefit and an injury. No one can
imagine, then, an exclusion of a great body of men, not from favors,
privileges, and trusts, but from the common advantages of society, can ever
be a thing intended for their good, or can ever be ratified by any implied
consent of theirs.
Burke, however, must have felt that this answer was incomplete, because he was
then led to a deeper consideration of the nature of law. Legislation does not rest
solely on the consent of the majority. Had the popery laws been consented to by a
majority of the Irish Catholic population, they would still have been invalid,133 since
such an act would have violated a higher law, the law established by God, "which it
is not in the power of any community, or of the whole race of man, to alter.'
3 4
"In reality," Burke continued, "there are two, and only two foundations of law,"
"both of them conditions without which nothing can give it any force."' 3 These are
"equity and utility. 136 Equity Burke understands as arising "out of the great rule of
131. Id. at 321.
132. Id. at 321.
133. In considering this matter, Burke raises the question whether a people might ever consent, not virtually
but actually, to a prejudicial law. This question had been an important one in the debates over slavery in the
seventeenth century, and writers like Grotius had argued that such consent was possible. Burke, however, would
have none of it: "But if we could suppose that such a ratification had been made, not virtually, but actually, by the
people, not representatively, but even collectively, still it would be null and void. They have no right to make a law
prejudicial to the whole community, even though the delinquents in making such an act should be themselves the
chief sufferers by it." Id. at 321-22.
134. l at 322 (continuing "It would be hard to point out any error more truly subversive of all the order and
beauty, of all the peace and happiness of human society, than the position, that any body of men have a right to
make what laws they please,--or that laws can derive any authority from their institution merely, and independent
of the quality of the subject-matter."). Hobbes endorsed the position that majorities can take what action they please,
and Burke notes, he has been "ably" and "frequently" refuted. Id.
135. Id. at 323.
136. Id.
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equality, which is grounded upon our common nature, and which Philo, with
propriety and beauty, calls the mother of justice.' ' 37 Laws such as the popery laws,
which "create an artificial difference between men . . . in order to induce a
consequential inequality in the distribution of justice" are no laws at all.'3 '
Burke saw utility, furthermore, not as the followers of Bentham do, by reference
to the greatest good of the greatest number. It must not be "partial or limited," but
instead be "general and public" and "connected in the same manner with, and derived
directly from, our rational nature.... .""9 Burke finds support for this proposition
from such varied sources as an excerpt of Paulus found in Justinian's Digest and a
declaration by the seventeenth-century Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez that a
universally accepted axiom about the reason and substance of law is that it is enacted
pro communi bono,14° "to advance the common good." Burke concluded that the
popery laws also violate utility because they advance the interest of a minority at the
expense of the majority's well-being.1
4 '
These arguments bring Burke to the heart of the Tract: The contention that the
sort of religious persecution which Britain was practicing was, without more, a
violation of natural law and natural rights.4 2 In arriving at this conclusion, Burke
returned to the Protestant contention that since the laws' purpose is itself a thing




Law is a mode of human action respecting society, and must be governed by the same rules of equity
which govern every private action; and so Tully considers it in his Ofices as the only utility agreeable
to that nature: Unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas uniuscujusque et
universorum; quam si ad se quisque rapiat, dissolvetur omnis hnumana consortio. (One proposition must
be held before all others, that the same utility prevails for each individual and for the entire group; for
if everyone takes for himself, all human sociability will be dissolved].
Id.
140. Id. at 324-25.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 326.
When people are gone, if not into a denial, at least into a sort of oblivion of those ideas, when they know
them only as barren speculations, and not as practical motives for conduct, it will be proper to press, as
well as to offer them to the understanding; and when one is attacked by prejudices which aim to intrude
themselves into the place of law, what is left for us but to vouch and call to warranty those principles
of original justice from whence alone our title to everything valuable in society is derived?
Id.
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this end must accordingly be "instrumentally good."'43 Such an assertion amounts to
a justification of religious persecution, which is intolerable:
I observe, that, if the principle of their final and beneficial intention be
admitted as ajust ground for such proceedings, there never was,.., nor ever
can be, such a thing as a religious persecution in the world. Such an
intention is pretended by all men,--who all not only insist that their religion
has the sanction of Heaven, but is likewise and for that reason, the best and
most convenient to human society. All ieligious persecution, Mr. Bayle well
observes, is grounded upon a miserable petitio principii. You are wrong, I
am right; you must come over to me,-or you must suffer.'"
Freedom of religion, Burke continues, is a fundamental natural right, which it is
the purpose of civil government to secure. t45 Religious persecution destroys the
substance of this right and is for that reason wrong-a violation of the natural law.
Also, because it goes against the nature of the Irish people, such a persecution will
inevitably prove ineffectual. "Ireland, after almost a century of persecution, is at this
hour full of penalties and full of Papists."' 46 The popery laws ought, therefore, to be
repealed.147 Burke saw no difficulty in retaining the established Irish Church, with
143. Id. at 332.
They will lay it down as a principle, that the Protestant religion is a thing beneficial for the whole
community, as well is in its civil interests as in those of a superior order. From thence they will argue,
that, the end being essentially beneficial, the means become instrumentally so; that these penalties and
incapacities are not final causes of the law, but only a discipline to bring over a deluded people to their
real interest, and therefore, though they may be harsh in their operation, they will be pleasant in their
effects; and be they what they will, they cannot be considered as a very extraordinary hardship, as it is
in the power of the sufferer to free himself when he pleases, and that only by converting to a better
religion, which it is his duty to embrace.
Id
144. Id. at 332-33.
Let me add, that the great inlet by which a color for oppression has entered into the world is by one
man's pretending to determine concerning the happiness of another, and by claiming a right to use what
means he thinks proper in order to bring him to a sense of it. It is the ordinary and trite sophism of
oppression.
See also PIERREBAYLg'S PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY: AMODERN TRANSLATION AND CRITICAL INTERPRETATION
(Amie Godman Tannenbaum, ed. & trans., 1987) (analyzing and translating Pierre Bayle, an important early
exponent of religious tolerance).
145. See TRACT, supra note 124, at 333 ("Everybody is satisfied that a conservation and secure enjoyment
of our natural rights is the great and ultimate purpose of civil society, and that therefore all forms whatsoever of
government are only good as they are subservient to that purpose to which they are entirely subordinate.").
146. Id. at 334.
147. Burke acknowledges that the repeal of a law should only be undertaken in extreme circumstances.
"[L]aws, like houses, lean on one another, and the operation is delicate ...,. Id. at 319. Repeal of the popery laws,
however, is necessary because the laws themselves are "fundamentally wrong, [and] the more perfect the law is
made the, worse it becomes." Id. at 320.
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the King of England as its head, but it should not persecute Catholics who hold
differing views about religion.""
Having demonstrated that the popery laws violated the natural law by advancing
the illegitimate aim of religious persecution, Burke considered the ways in which
they also shattered the bonds of affection that Irish and English ought to have for one
another. By dispossessing parents of their estates in land should their offspring
convert, the laws have provoked a "revolt" of children "against their parents."149 The
prohibition on Catholic education, furthermore, destroys the natural responsibility
parents have for assisting children to find their place in the world. 150 The prohibition
on Catholic ownership of firearms is so extreme as to amount to "a scheme of
tyranny."'' The land laws have been so applied against Catholics that they have
effectively destroyed all habits of industry or frugality."5 2 Taken collectively, these
laws operate as "a direct discouragement to melioration,--as directly as if the law
had said in express terms, 'Thou shalt not improve."9
5 3
But matters might be changed for the better. As in his arguments on India, Burke
places the burden on England to respect the pre-existing culture. The Irish hold their
religious beliefs close to their hearts as by a sort of prescriptive right that predates the
Reformation.154 They have rebelled against an English rule that has made "the most
unparalleled oppression.'15 Should England allow Irish Catholics to experience
"temporal happiness" they will not be so willing to invoke their religion as grounds
for revolt.156 Religious fanaticism is kept alive "by ill usage."'5 7 A gentle rule, which
148. Id. at 339. In an important article, Michael W. McConnell has demonstrated that Burke's conception
of religious establishment necessarily embraced the notion of tolerance of dissenting faiths. The Establishment in
England, McConnell continues, enjoyed its status not because it was the one, true faith, to which others had to
conform, but because the experience of the English people had taught that this arrangement was best for England.
See Edmund Burke's Tolerant Establishment, in RELIGIOUS LiBERTY IN WESTERN THOUGHT 203, 219 (Noel B.
Reynolds and W. Cole Durham, Jr. eds., 1996). McConnell concludes: 'Toleration and establishment are... not
inconsistent principles, but alterative strategies for attaining the same objective: to nurture and strengthen the
religious sensibilities that are the best and most reliable source of moral restraint." Id. at 244.
149. TRACT, supra note 124, at 306.
150. Id. at 311-13.
151. Id. at 314.
152. Id. at 351-55.
153. Id. at 353.
154. "It is proper to recollect that this religion, which is so persecuted in its members, is the old religion of
the country, and the once established religion of the state .... " Id. at 336.
155. Id. at 356.
156. Id. at 356-57. "The principle of religion is seldom lasting; the majority of men are in no persuasion
bigots; they are not willing to sacrifice, on every vain imagination that superstition or enthusiasm holds forth, or
that even zeal and piety recommend, the certain possession of their temporal happiness." Id. This passage must not
be read as a criticism of religion as such, but of the kind of religious fanaticism that undermines the relationships
on which a healthy society depends. Burke was deeply opposed to atheism and once wrote that "I am attached to
Christianity at large; much from conviction; more from affection." (Quoted in McConnell, supra note 148, at 206).
McConnell offers the following observation about Burke's own brand of Christianity:
[W]hile it is surely dangerous to deduce a statesman's theology from public statements and writings on
political themes, these sources convey an impression that Burke understood religion almost exclusively
as a source of a moral code, of hope and consolation on earth, and of rewards and punishments in the
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stresses the common interests of Irish Catholics and English Protestants, on the other
hand, is founded on the "home-bred connections" which are the "natural basis" of
society.' In this way, "the passions of men are cooled" and the Irish can be incor-
porated within the empire on the basis of consent and mutual interest. 59
In the 1790s, near the end of his life, Burke returned to the subject of Ireland in
a series of letters intended, for the most part, to be made public. These letters
represent variations on themes already struck in the Tract on the Popery Laws. The
worst of the popery laws had been repealed, but conditions for Irish Catholics
remained deplorable.' t° Burke stressed repeatedly the counterproductive nature of
English rule. English attacks on the papacy have only partially succeeded: They have
diminished Irish Catholic respect for that office, but have not thereby won any
converts for the Protestant cause; rather, they have driven luke-warm Catholics into
the arms of the Jacobins threatening Christian Europe.' 61 The Protestant Ascendency
that ruled in Ireland, furthermore, by arrogating to itself special prerogatives and
life to come .... Notably lacking in Burke's extensive speeches and writings about religion is any
reference to the central tenet of mainstream Christianity: the vicarious atonement of Jesus Christ and
the redemption through faith in Him .... On the other hand, Burke did not move in the direction of
rational religion, so attractive to many of his contemporaries.
Id. at 207.
157. Tract on the Popery Laws, IV WRrr NGS AND SPEECHES 299,367 n.145.
158. Id at 330. Burke was generally troubled by those who considered religious ties close and endearing and
their country to be no bond at all. Such persons celebrate the cause of Protestant or Papist, while brutally oppressing
countrymen who disagreed with their persuasion:
[Tio lose all feeling for those who have grown up by our sides, in our eyes, the benefit of whose cares
and labors we have partaken from our birth, and meretriciously to hunt abroad after foreign affections,
is such a disarrangement of the whole system of our duties, that I do not know whether benevolence so
displaced is not almost the same thing as destroyed, or what effect bigotry could have produced that is
more fatal to society.
Id. at 330.
159. Id. at 360.
160. In 1782, legislation was enacted abolishing restrictions on Catholic landownership and allowing Catholic
clergy to perform most ecclesiastical ceremonies. See 21 & 22 Geo. III c. 24 (1782). Other legislation passed the
same year permitted Catholics to "keep school," although this had to be done under the supervision of the Protestant
clergy. See 21 & 22 Geo. III c. 62 (1782). The most restrictive features of Poynings' Law were also repealed, thus
conferring on the Irish Parliament a substantial degree of autonomy. 21 & 22 Geo. III c. 47 (1782). See R.B.
McDowell, COLONIAL NATIONALISM AND THE WINNING OF PARLIAMENTARY INDEPENDENCE, 1760-1782, in IV A
NEw HISTORY OF IRELAND, supra note 118, at 233.
161. Second Letterto Sir Hercules Langrishe, May 26, 1795, VI WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 378, 380-81.
The worst of the matter is this: you are partly leading, partly driving into Jacobinism that description
of your people whose religious principles, church polity, and habitual discipline might make them an
invincible dike against that inundation. This you have a thousand mattocks and pickaxes lifted up to
demolish. You make a sad story of the Pope. 0 seri studiorum! It will not be difficult to get many called
Catholics to laugh at this fundamental part of their religion. Never doubt it. You have succeeded in part,
and you may succeed completely. But in the present state of men's minds and affairs, do not flatter
yourselves that they will piously look to the head of our Church in the place of that Pope whom you
make them forswear, and out of all reverence to whom you bully and rail and buffoon them.... You
have no security for anything, but that they will become what are called Franco-Jacobins, and reject
the whole together.
Id.
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privileges at the expense of the Catholic majority had turned itself into a
despotism.1 62 Burke remained deeply concerned to the end of his days about Irish
affairs: By remaining fixated on popery, the Protestant overlords of Ireland had lost
sight of the actual dangers threatening them.'63
Ultimately, after much bloodshed, the Republic of Ireland was able to establish
its political independence in the early part of this century. The subsequent course of
Irish history, however, is less important to our concerns than the prescriptions Burke
laid down for proper British governance in Ireland. Attempting to force a people to
change its religion was tyrannous and futile in the same way the French
Revolutionary attempt to destroy religion would later prove futile. The Irish people
had chosen Catholicism, with its reverence for a priestly class and its other particular
institutions, beliefs, and practices. They had maintained this attachment in the face
of severe penalties. The habits of thought and action arising from this choice had
been ingrained into their nature over the course of centuries and become central to
their identity. It was therefore against their nature to become Protestants. It was
unjust and unnatural to force them to convert.
Burke urged the English to face Irish discontent with compromise and
generosity. He counseled a light hand, not because he thought that one opinion or
culture was better than another, but because he was convinced that governments and
empires can exist only with the acceptance and affection of the people. Better to let
a people out of the Empire than to allow habits of rule by force and terror to establish
themselves in a free country like England. Such habits would corrupt the motherland
as they would tyrannize the possession and impoverish the whole British Empire.
V. AMERICA: A DIFFERENT KIND OF ENGLISHMAN
When Burke took his seat in Parliament in December, 1765, the nation was
confronted with a growing crisis over its North American colonies. The conclusion
of the Seven Years' War (usually called the French and Indian War in the United
States) left the treasury in need of revenue and the American colonies with a new
162. Letter to Richard Burke, esq., on the Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland, 1793, VI WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES, 385, 389-90.
But it will be said, in that country some people are free. Why, this is the very description of despotism.
Partial freedom is privilege and prerogative, and not liberty. Liberty, such as deserves the name, is an
honest, equitable, diffusive, and impartial principle. It is a great and enlarged virtue, and not a sordid,
selfish, and illiberal vice. It is the portion of the mass of the citizens, and not the haughty licence of
some potent individual or some predominant faction.
Id.
163. The Protestants continue to carry with them "the burden of the old song about Popery. Poor souls, they
are to be pitied, who think of nothing but the dangers long passed by, and but little of the perils that actually
surround them." A Letter on the Affairs of Ireland, 1797, VI WRITINGS AND SPEEcHEs 413,428.
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sense of accomplishment and independence.' 64 In order to raise needed funds, the
new Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Grenville, shepherded through Parliament
the Sugar Act, which, at least superficially, offered the promise of a reduction in the
duties on molasses shipped to the colonies, but in reality amounted to a significant
new tax.'6 The colonists, however, reacted with protests and also began to question
the constitutional status of British rule in North America.1 "
Undeterred by American complaints, Grenville next saw through Parliament the
Stamp Act of 1765, which had as its purpose the imposition of a tax on all official
documents, such as marriage licenses and pleadings filed in civil litigation, as well
as many other items of everyday commerce. 67 The outcry against the Stamp Act far
exceeded the protest against the Sugar Act: The colonists set about putting an
embargo on British goods and young firebrands such as Patrick Henry questioned
whether England could constitutionally impose taxes or otherwise oblige the
colonists to obey English laws.
t68
Within months, a move to repeal the Stamp Act was well underway, although its
ultimate repeal was accompanied by the passage of the Declaratory Act, which
maintained that the English Parliament had the constitutional authority to impose
taxes on its American colonies.' 69 Burke himself spoke against the Stamp Act and in
favor of the Declaratory Act, seeing the tax on documents as a flawed, but ultimately
constitutional policy.170 Quickly, however, British politicians began to regret the
repeal of the Stamp Act and set about devising a new scheme for taxing the
164. See DON COOK, THE LONG FUSE: HOW ENGLAND LOST THE AMERICAN COLONIES, 1760-1785 2 (1995)
("The end of the Seven Years' War set the stage on both sides of the Atlantic for the American War of
Independence. The British Army had routed the French from Canada and the American colonies, but sizable English
forces stayed behind, ostensibly to guarantee the peace .... "
"The American colonies... emerged from the war with their western frontiers secure, free of any threat from
a foreign power now that the French were gone .... There was not the slightest doubt at that time about the
overwhelming loyalty of the colonial population to King George III .... But America was also imbued with a
heightened sense of independent political and economic strength and a vision of expansion and destiny.").
165. By its terms, the Sugar Act reduced by half the duty on molasses, but extended it to cover previously
untaxed molasses from the British West Indies. More effective means of enforcement were also provided for,
including the transference of cases to admiralty courts, to avoid the widespread refusal by colonial juries to convict
thosp who evaded payment on the tax. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BtRTH OFTE REPUBLIC, 1763-1789 16 (3d
ed., 1992); COOK, supra note 164, at 60-62 (discussing the Sugar Act).
166. See MORGAN, supra note 165, at 16-20 (opining that the Sugar Act gave rise to the argument that
Parliament lacked the authority to tax the colonies because the colonists lacked representation in that body).
167. See COOK, supra note 164, at 63-64 (summarizing of the provisions of the Act). Cook lists some of the
items which required government stamps for validity: "Stamp taxes would be levied on the probate of wills, liquor
licenses, deeds, leases, mortgages, insurance policies, bonds, ship charters, bills of lading, customs clearances,
newspapers, pamphlets, books, almanacs, advertisements, playing cards, dice." Id. at 64. On the political
circumstances involved in the passage of the Stamp Act, see generally P.D.G. THOMAS, BRITISH POLITICS AND THE
STAMP ACT CRISIS: THE FIRST PHASE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763-1767 (1975); JOHN L. BULLION, A
GREAT AND NECESSARY MEASURE GEORGE GRENVuIE AN THE GENESIS OFTHE STAMP ACT, 1763-1765 (1982).
168. See COO, supra note 164, at 70-87.
169. Id. at 89-91. The duties imposed by the Sugar Act were also reduced by two-thirds. Id. at 108.
170. Id. at 90-91. See PAULLANGFORD, THEFRSTROCK NGHAMADMNISTtATION, 1765-1766 152-53 (1973)
(addressing the drafting of the Declaratory Act and Burke's support of it).
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colonies,' as much for reasons of politics as for reasons of revenue."7 These efforts
resulted in the Townshend Duties, passed by Parliament in 1767. 3
Once again, the colonists greeted the new taxes with a mixture of alarm and
outrage. Benjamin Franklin argued that the time had come for the colonies to enjoy
"'fair and equal representation"' in Parliament.' 74 John Dickinson asserted that
constitutionally Parliament had the power only to regulate trade with the colonies,
not raise revenue from them. 75 Samuel Adams rejected in even clearer terms the
right of Parliament to tax.176 Finally, in 1770 "all the Townshend duties were
repealed except the tea tax, which was retained as a symbol of Parliament's right to
tax., ,"'
The repeal of the Townshend duties seemed to defuse the crisis, at least for a
while. Feelings were once again aroused in 1773, when Parliament, in order to help
the East India Company through a financial crisis, reduced the taxes owed on tea
transshipped to America and permitted "the East India Company to carry its tea
directly to the colonies.' ' 78 The practical effect of this subsidy would be to lower
prices for American consumers of tea and thereby "secure for the company a
monopoly of the American market."' 9 The American-especially the New
England-merchant class took the reduction in the duty paid on English tea as an
attack on their interests, and quickly found common cause with the radical opponents
of British rule.'1° They realized that "if Parliament could manipulate taxes to produce
a tea monopoly, it could do so as well for any and all commodities."''
The colonists now responded with more than protests and pamphlets. In
December, 1773, a group of men, dressed as Indians, boarded British ships in Boston
171. See Edmund Burke, Speech on American Taxation, in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES ON AMERICA
105 (Thomas H.D. Mahoney ed., 1964) (stating, as Burke put it, "The very next session, as the fashion of this world
passes away, the repeal began to be in as bad an odor in this House as the Stamp Act had been in the session
before.").
172. See P.D.G. THOMAS, THE TOWNsHEND DuTirs CRISIS: THE SECOND PHASE OF THE AMERICAN
REOLUrON, 1767-1773 30 (1987) (observing, concerning the motivation of Charles Townshend, who led the fight
for the new taxes: "His aims were political rather than financial, the reestablishment of the practice of colonial
taxation and the making of Parliamentary provision for the costs of civil government and the administration of
justice in the colonies").
173. See COOK, supra note 164, at 121-27 (examining the Townshend Duties). The items upon which duties
were imposed included "paints, painters' colors, lead, glass, and tea imported into America from Great Britain."
See T.H.D. Mahoney, Introduction, in SELECD wRITINGs AND SPEECHES ON AMERICA xii (Thomas H.D.
Mahoney ed., 1964). Mahoney adds: '"hese acts also authorized writs of assistance, set up an American customs
board to supervise enforcement of the revenue laws, and provided that tax revenues should pay the salaries of royal
officials in America and defray the expenses of British troops in the colonies." Id.
174. See COOK, supra note 164, at 124 (quoting Franklin).
175. Id. at 124-27.
176. I1. at 129.
177. See Mahoney, supra note 173, at xiii.
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harbor and dumped their cargoes of tea overboard. This event simultaneously
captured the imagination of restive Americans who stopped British merchant ships
from entering American ports up and down the coast, and goaded the English Parlia-
ment into passage of the Coercive Acts, meant to punish Massachusetts for the
destruction of British tea.1
82
Burke was a member of Parliament throughout these events, as well as a member
of the Rockingham Administration that repealed the Stamp Act in 1766. In the year
1770, because of his avowed sympathies for the colonies, he was elected London
Agent for New York Affairs, a position he held until 1774.183 American affairs
figured prominently in his writings from the mid-1760s to the early 1780s.14 Two
speeches in particular, however, composed respectively in 1774 and 1775, as the
American situation moved rapidly toward war, represent his most sustained
contribution to the debate.8 5
Delivered in April, 1774, in the aftermath of the Boston Tea Party and in the
midst of legislative debate and action on the Coercive Acts, the Speech on American
Taxation was an effort to reverse English revenue policy toward the American
colonies. 1 Much of the speech was concerned with interpreting the history of British
dealings with the colonies, which divided roughly into two periods: that before and
that after 1764. For most of the period before 1764, economic relations with the
colonies were governed by the Navigation Acts, which created a monopoly of British
trade in North America, thereby giving British industries an assured market for their
182. See COOK, supra note 164, at 186-88 (reviewing the provisions of the Coercive Acts). See generally
P.D.G. THOMAS, TEA PARTY TO INDEPENDENCE: THE THIRD PHASE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1773-1776
(1991).
183. See Ross J.S. HOFFMAN, EDMUND BURKE, NEw YORK AGENT, WITH His LETrERS TO THE NEW YORK
ASSEMBLY (1956).
184. See Mahoney, supra note 173, at ix-xxi (reviewing Burke's writing on America during this time).
185. Also of importance is Burke's essay Observation on a Late Publication entitled 'The Present State of
the Nation, in SELECTED WRIrINGs 6-56. Written in 1769, this essay was a response to a pamphlet by William Knox
which had attacked the Rockingham Whigs for their repeal of the Stamp Act, called for American representation
in Parliament thereby removing the colonials' chief constitutional objection to Parliament's power to tax, and
argued for the imposition of substantial new taxes on the colonies, to be collected according to means established
by the colonial assemblies.
Perhaps sensing that Knox's arguments were pretextual-give the Americans representation expressly to
facilitate the imposition of taxes-Burke attacked the practicality of the proposals. To provide the Americans with
representation was impossible, according to Burke. The distance to be traversed was simply too great: The
American representatives might arrive to find Parliament already dissolved, or the monarch dead, or important
matters already decided. Americans, furthermore, could not afford to serve in Parliament, since members were
required to provide for their own transportation and lodging. As well, disputed elections could never be properly
resolved, because of time and travel constraints. Id. at 27-31.
Elsewhere, Burke asserted that another reason at least some Americans should be denied representation was
the slave-holding character of their colonies: "[C]ommon sense, nay self-preservation, seems to forbid, that those
who allow themselves unlimited right over the liberties and lives of others, should have any share in making laws
for those who have long renounced such unjust and cruel distinctions." RUSSELL KIRK, EDMUND BURKE: A GENIUS
RECONSIDERED 57 (1967).
186. See Speech on American Taxation, in SELECED WRITINGS, supra note 185, at 57-115.
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goods. 87 The Acts, however, left untouched the question of revenue collected from
the colonies in the form of taxes, and in practice virtually no taxes were imposed.
These Acts collectively established as British policy the principle that the American
colonies "contribute... to the strength of the empire" by their exclusive trade with
the motherland. 88 But with the enactment of the Sugar Act, this policy was altered;
it seemed that a new fundamental ground had been established for the relationship,
the collection of revenue from the colonies, which was simply superimposed on the
old trade monopoly.189
Burke believed that a return to the status quo before 1764 would have salutary
effects on British-North American relations. He based his argument on customary
practice, sound public policy, and a respect for Americans as participants in a British
constitutional order that prided itself on the liberty of the subject. As a matter of
customary practice, the colonists had been loyal British subjects from 1660 to 1764.
In explaining why the Americans endured a monopoly of trade for this period of
time, Burke stated:
[Mien do bear the inevitable constitution of their original nature with all its
infirmities. The Act of Navigation attended the colonies from their infancy,
grew with their growth, and strengthened with their strength. They were
confirmed in obedience to it even more by usage than by law. They scarcely
had remembered a time when they were not subject to such restraint.90
187. Id. at 76 ("Permit me then, Sir, to lead your attention very far back-back to the Act of Navigation, the
cornerstone of the policy of this country with regard to its colonies. Sir, that policy was from the beginning purely
commercial, and the commercial system was wholly restrictive. It was the system of a monopoly. No trade was let
loose from that constraint, but merely to enable the colonists to dispose of what in the course of your trade you
could not take, or to enable them to dispose of such articles as we forced upon them, and for which, without some
degree of liberty, they could not pay .... This principle of commercial monopoly runs through no less than twenty-
nine acts of Parliament, from the year 1660 to the unfortunate period of 1764.").
The British monopoly of trade allowed the mother country to develop some large and substantial domestic
industries. See PAUL LANGFORD, 'A PoLrE AND COMMERCIAL PFOPLE:' ENGLAND, 1727-1783 168-70 (1989)
(providing documentation for the assertion that "[c]olonial demand extended to a range of British manufactures,
but provided a special boost to some of the newer ones.").
188. Id. at 77.
189. Id. at78.
The scheme of a colony revenue by British authority appeared ... to the Americans in the light of a
great innovation. The words of Governor Bernard's ninth letter, written in November, 1765, state this
idea very strongly. 'It must,' says he, 'have been supposed such an innovation as a parliamentary
taxation would cause a great alarm, and meet with much opposition in most parts of America; it was
quite new to the people and had no visible bounds set to it.' After stating the weakness of government
there, he says, 'Was this a time to introduce so great a novelty as a parliamentary inland taxation in
America'?
Id.
190. Id. at 78.
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"Experience," not "invention" should be the guide Britain adopts for resolving
the conflict over taxation. 9" Experience, Burke demonstrates through involved his-
torical argument, teaches that the colonists were loyal and obedient subjects until
long-standing arrangements were disrupted. It is reasonable to assume that they
would return to the fold if the old arrangements were restored.9
2
Burke acknowledged that much energy had been expended over whether Britain
had the constitutional authority to tax the colonies, but he had no desire to open the
door to this controversy' 93 He wished to keep the argument focused entirely on the
time-honored and the practicable: "Consult and follow your experience. Let not the
long story with which I have exercised your patience prove fruitless to your
interests.'94
But recollection of the amicability colonials and Britons shared under the
Navigation Acts is not the only reason Burke gave for returning to the status quo
before 1764. It also made sense for reasons of public policy to take this course of
action. The tea tax was imposed upon commercial principles, and it should be
repealed for the same reason. 95 A return to the old principles would allow the
colonies to continue on their path of astonishing economic prosperity, 96 and this
191. Id. at 58.
192. Id. at 114.
I have shown... that in time of peace you flourished in commerce, and when war required it had
sufficient aid from the colonies, while you pursued your ancient policy; that you threw everything into
confusion when you made the Stamp Act; and that you restored everything to peace and order when you
repealed it. I have shown that the revival of the system of taxation has produced the very worst effects,
and that the partial repeal has produced not partial good but universal evil. Let these considerations,
founded on facts not one of which can be denied, bring us back to our reason by the road of our
experience.
Id.
193. See id. at 67 (asserting that it is not "declaratory of a right... [but] is only a recital of the expediency
of a right supposed already to have been asserted. . ."). And again, on the question of the right to tax: "I am not
here going into the distinctions of rights nor attempting to mark their boundaries. I do not enter into these
metaphysical distinctions; I hate the very sound of them. Leave the Americans as they anciently stood .... They
and we, and their and our ancestors, have been happy under that system." Id. at 110.
194. Id. at 109. Russell Kirk has observed: "Custom and usage, in fine, are firm ground for justice and for
voluntary acceptance of necessary authority .... Accustomed to a high degree of liberty, the Americans must be
indulged in their old ways; and the whole empire would prosper by this prudent avoidance of extreme doctrines."
See KIRK, supra note 185, at 67.
195. "It has been said again and again that the five taxes were repealed on commercial principles .... Repeal
this tax, too, upon commercial principleq, if you please." Id. at 62-63.
196. Id. at 78-79.
Nothing in the history of mankind is like their progress. For my part, I never cast an eye on their
flourishing commerce and their cultivated and commodious life but they seem to me rather ancient
nations grown to perfection through a long series of fortunate events and a train of successful industry,
accumulating wealth in many centuries, than the colonies of yesterday-4than a set of miserable outcasts,
not so much sent as thrown out on the bleak and barren shore of a desolate wilderness three thousand
miles from all civilized intercourse.
Id.
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would benefit the motherland much more than the paltry revenues they might collect
from the tea tax.
197
Burke, furthermore, was afraid that the lawyers and the politicians might
continue to press their case against the colonies. Townshend, according to Burke,
"conceived ... that the flourishing trade of this country was greatly owing to law and
institution and not quite so much to liberty, for but too many are apt to believe
regulation to be commerce and taxes to be revenue.' ' 98 Those who press this point
are likely to engage in half-measures which leave matters worse than before. They
use "too much logic and too little common sense."' 99 "Recover your old ground and
your old tranquility; .. .I am persuaded the Americans will compromise with
you."2w The alternative to compromise, Burke concluded grimly, was very likely
war.
2 01
This much, Burke continued, was required by the British Constitution and by
what he calls the constitution of the British empire. Burke envisioned a federated
structure to the empire, in which Parliament possesses ultimate sovereignty, but in
which the constituent members also enjoy autonomy that should not ordinarily be
disturbed. Indeed, Parliament is to act only where subordinate legislatures are
incapable (or refuse to) fulfill their responsibilities. Burke explains:
The Parliament of Great Britain sits at the head of her extensive empire in
two capacities. One, as the local legislature of this island, providing for all
things at home, immediately, and by no other instrument than the executive
power. The other, and I think her nobler capacity, is what I call her imperial
character, in which, as from the throne of heaven, she superintends all the
several inferior legislatures and guides and controls them all without
annihilating any. As all these provincial legislatures are only co-ordinate to
each other, they ought all to be subordinate to her, else they can neither
preserve mutual peace, nor hope for mutual justice, nor effectually afford
mutual assistance. It is necessary to coerce the negligent, to restrain the
violent, and to aid the weak and deficient by the overruling plenitude of her
power. She is never to intrude into the place of the others, while they are
equal to the common ends of their institution?'
197. "All this was done by England [the astonishing growth of both the colonies and Britain] while England
pursued trade and forgot revenue. You not only acquired commerce but you actually created the very objects of
trade in America, and by that creation you raised the trade of this kingdom at least fourfold." Id. at 79.
198. Id. at 83.
199. Id. at 109.
200. Id.
201. "Incredible as it may seem, you know that you have deliberately thrown away a large duty, which you
held secure and quiet in your hands, for the vain hope of getting three-fourths less, through every hazard, through
certain litigation, and possibly through war." Id. at 65-66.
202. The structure of empire that Burke envisioned, including even the canonistic term of art "plenitude of
power," is reminiscent of the relationship of pope and bishops in medieval canon law. See BRIAN TIERNEY,
RELIGION, LAW AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT, 1150-1650 (1982); KENNETH PENNINGTON,
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While Parliament's powers are theoretically boundless, they must be limited by
their proper object: maintaining a peaceful and prosperous empire bound together by
the consent of those so governed. The taxation measures of the previous decade
violated this basic principle of imperial organization. The American assemblies had
their proper authority threatened and the Americans justifiably concluded that "their
sole image of freedom" was being "annihilated." '2 3 The consent on which true
governance was based was absent insofar as these measures were concerned.2° By
pressing the issue of sovereignty and attempting to coerce the Americans into
obedience, the supporters of taxation were in effect provoking rebellion.'n 5 Burke, for
his part, would stand on the old system: by limiting central authority over the
colonies, "it fixes on the firmest foundations a real, consistent, well-grounded
authority in Parliament. Until you come back to that system, there will be no peace
for England." 206
Britain therefore must govern its empire constitutionally. The representative
institutions of the colonies ought to be respected. The Sugar Act and the Stamp Act
amounted to a radical repudiation of a century of experience in governing the
colonies. The enactment of this legislation led the colonists to conclude that the
fundamental relationship they enjoyed with the motherland was being altered. This
belief was the ultimate source of their grievances. Governance with a light hand, in
accord with tested and true methods, would work best where the Americans were
concerned. Rebellion might yet be prevented.
Burke's second major address on American affairs, the Speech on Moving
Conciliation with the Colonies, occurred in March, 1775, as the colonies began to
mount open rebellion to English authority. The First Continental Congress had
POPE AND BISHOPS: TWE PAPAL MONARCHY IN THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES (1984) (discussing
twelfth- and thirteenth-centMry canonistic structure).
It must be stressed that Burke was no legal positivist blind to the possibility that Parliament might abuse its
potentially limitless powers. He stressed that its powers must always be conformed to the constitution. In England,
furthermore, Parliament, as the local legislature for the island, must respect and follow the particular traditions and
legal rights that had developed over time as the people sought to conserve their society in the face of changing
circumstances. In the empire, Parliament was bound by the traditions, laws, and needs of the various peoples she
governed. In both instances, the final, crucial restriction came from an immutable natural law that required the
governors to pursue and respect the interests of the governed.
203. Speech on American Taxation, in SELEcrED WRrrNGS, supra note 185, at 85.
204. "No man ever doubted that the commodity of tea could bear an imposition of threepence. But no
commodity will bear threepence, or will bear a penny when the general feelings of men are irritated and two
millions of people are resolved not to pay." Id. at 66.
205. Id. at 110-11.
But if, intemperately, unwisely, fatally, you sophisticate and poison the very source of government by
urging subtle deductions and consequences odious to those you govern from the unlimited and
illimitable nature of supreme sovereignty, you will teach them by these means to call that sovereignty
itself in question. When you drive him hard, the boar will surely turn upon the hunters. If that
sovereignty and their freedom cannot be reconciled, which will they take? They will cast your
sovereignty in your face. No one will be argued into slavery.
Id.
206. Id. at 115.
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assembled the previous autumn and had repudiated the Coercive Acts and the whole
notion of parliamentary supremacy." 7 The Battles of Lexington and Concord lay a
month away in the future. War was imminent, but Burke still struggled to stave it off.
In addressing the House of Commons, Burke's avowed intention was to restore
"peace," "[n]ot peace through the medium of war, not peace to be hunted through the
labyrinth of intricate and endless negotiations; not peace to arise out of universal
discord, fomented from principle, in all parts of the empire... [but] simple peace,
sought in its natural course and its ordinary haunts." ° To achieve this peace, he
continued, it was necessary to understand the "cause[s] of [the] disobedient spirit in
the colonies." '
Fundamentally, Burke asserted, the root of American intransigence is the same
love of liberty that all Englishmen hold dear:
[T]he people of the colonies are descendants of Englishmen. England, sir,
is a nation which still, I hope, respects, and formerly adored, her freedom.
The colonists emigrated from you when this part of your character was most
predominant, and they took this bias and direction the moment they parted
from your hands. They are therefore not only devoted to liberty, but to
liberty according to English ideas and on English principles.2 °
In the New World this love of liberty had room to grow and to flourish and was
now "stronger in the English colonies, probably, than in any other people of the earth
.... ,21n The causes of this flourishing were many and varied. England's benign
neglect of colonies gave them room to form popular assemblies, which in turn
developed habits of self-government, including self-taxation.2 2 The Puritan faith of
the northern colonies also inculcated a love of liberty among the inhabitants there.
Differing from one another in many particulars, these factious denominations shared
a history of struggle against persecution. And the colonists began leaving England
at a time when religious fervor, and dissenting sects in particular, were at their
height.213 The many non-English Europeans who were now settling the northern
207. See MoRGAN, supra note 165, at 61-64; THOMAs, TEA PARTY TO INDEPENDENCE, supra note 182, at 143-
73.
208. Speech on Moving Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies, in SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note
185, at 119-120.
209. Id. at 136.
210. Id. at 132.
211. Id. at 131-32.
212. Id. at 132-33.
213. "All Protestantism, even the most cold and passive, is a sort of dissent. But the religion most prevalent
in our northern colonies is a refinement on the principle of resistance; it is the dissidence of dissent, and the
protestantism of the Protestant religion." Id. at 134.
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colonies have only continued this trend." 4 In the southern colonies, ironically, it was
slavery that helped to stimulate a sense of freedom, at least among those not in
bondage.
215
Also contributing to the American love of liberty was their widespread study of
the law. "In no country, perhaps, in the world, is the law so general a study." 2t6Burke
acknowledges that there are those in Parliament who will assert that knowledge of
the law should teach the colonists "more clearly the rights of legislature, their
obligations to obedience, and the penalties of rebellion. ' 21 7 But in fact, the Americans
have developed a "stubborn and litigious" spirit? 8 Their study has made them
"acute, inquisitive, dexterous, prompt in attack, ready in defense, full of resources.
In other countries, the people, more simple and of a less mercurial cast, judge of an
ill principle in government only by an actual grievance; here they anticipate the evil
and judge of the pressure of the grievance by the badness of the principle. They
augur misgovernment at a distance and snuff the approach to tyranny in every tainted
breeze."
2 19
If this were not enough, English efforts to govern the colonies must also contend
with geography:."Three thousand miles of ocean lie between you and them."'How,
therefore, must England govern such a liberty-loving and unruly people set at such
a great distance from central authority? Burke proposes that England is bound by the
"immutable condition, the eternal law, of extensive and detached empire," which
requires that authority be lightly asserted.?1 But where England and America are
concerned, light control was a blessing, not a curse. This was because of the mutual
ties of affection and kinship that bind England to her colonies:
214. "Mhat stream of foreigners which has been constantly flowing into these colonies has for the greatest
part been composed of dissenters from the establishments of their several countries, and have brought with them
a temper and character far from alien to that of the people with whom they mixed." Id.
215. "[I]n Virginia and the Carolinas they have a vast multitude of slaves. Where this is the case in any part
of the world, those who are free are by far the most proud andjealous of their freedom. Freedom is to them not only
an enjoyment but a kind of rank and privilege.... I do not mean, sir, to commend the superior morality of this
sentiment, which has at least as much pride as virtue in it .... "Id. at 134-35.





221. l. at 137.
In large bodies, the circulation of power must be less vigorous at the extremities. Nature has said it. The
Turk cannot govern Egypt and Arabia and Kurdistan as he governs Thrace; nor has he the same
dominion in Crimea and Algiers which he has at Brusa and Smyrna. Despotism itself is obliged to truck
and huckster. The sultan gets such obedience as he can. He governs with a loose rein, that he may
govern at all, and the whole of the force and vigor of his authority in his center is derived from a prudent
relaxation in all his borders. Spain, in her provinces, is perhaps not so well obeyed as you are in yours.
She complies, too; she submits; she watches time.
Id.
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My hold of the colonies is in the close affection which grows from common
names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges and equal protection.
These are ties which, though light as air, are as strong as links of iron. Let
the colonists always keep the idea of their civil rights associated with your
government; they will cling and grapple to you, and no force under heaven
will be power to tear them from their allegiance.... As long as you have
the wisdom to keep the sovereign authority of this country as the sanctuary
of liberty, the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith, wherever the
chosen race and sons of England worship freedom, they will turn their faces
toward you.m
What, then, ought Britain to do about the present rebellion? England might try
to prosecute the Americans criminally, but this would lead to catastrophe. As Burke
observed, "I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against an whole
people." 3 England might consider force, but that would destroy America and
deplete English reserves. 4 England thus had no choice, according to Burke, but to
conciliate.' America must be allowed to keep its ancient privileges and immunities.
After all, what else is an empire but:
[T]he aggregate of many states under one common head ..... It does, in
such constitutions, frequently happen (and nothing but the dismal, cold, dead
uniformity of servitude can prevent its happening) that the subordinate parts
have many local privileges and immunities. Between these privileges and the
supreme common authority the line may be extremely nice.... But though
222. Id. at 181-82. When Burke, a native Irishman, speaks of England as a "chosen race" it is, of course, a
metaphorical choice of words. Burke stresses this theme of affection elsewhere, when he states:
Do you imagine, than, that it is the Land-Tax Act which raises your revenue? That it is the annual vote
in the Committee of Supply which give you your army? Or that it is the Mutiny Bill which inspires it
with bravery and discipline? No! Surely, no! It is the love of the people; it is their attachment to their
government, from the sense of the deep stake they have in such a glorious institution, which gives you
your army and your navy, and infuses into both that liberal obedience without which your army would
be a base rabble and your navy nothing but rotten timber.
Id. at 182-83.
223. Id. at 145.
224. "The thing you fought for is not the thing you recover, but depreciated, sunk, wasted, and consumed
in the contest .... I do not choose to consume its strength along with our own, because in all parts it is the British
strength that I consume." Id. at 131.
225. "I propose, by removing the ground of the difference and by restoring the former unsuspecting
confidence of the colonies in the mother country, to give permanent satisfaction to your people .... Id. at 120.
To this end, Burke set out a plan consisting of thirteen resolutions. Id. at 161-71. His plan was subsequently rejected
by Parliament. See CARL B. CONE, BURKE AND THE NATUREPP POLrICS: THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
17 (1957) (arguing that these "proposals would not have satisfied the Americans in 1775, if we may accept as
statements of their sentiments the documents issued by the second Continental Congress ...."). Russell Kirk,
however, has asserted that "Burke's program, adopted earlier, might possibly have been a basis for compromise
and gradual accommodation and reform." See KIRK, supra note 185, at 70.
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every privilege is an exemption "(in the case)"from the ordinary exercise of
the supreme authority, it is no denial of it.2'
Burke was no advocate of appeasement, but in his view American demands were
not unreasonable. Americans had not yet called for perfect, abstract freedom. Instead
they sought a return to the "happy and liberal condition" short of full freedom that
they were accustomed to enjoy. A return to this time-worn arrangement defined by
customary practices and chartered rights would restore the affections on which all
government rely. 7
Burke feared that bad policies toward America would grievously injure the
British Constitution and produce an eternal rent and schism in the British nation.228
But America could be retained as part of the empire if allowed sufficient free rein to
keep her liberties. Empires, after all,.consist of many and varied parts, enjoying
locally distinctive privileges and immunities. Common interests and affections would
bind Americans to England, provided the ties of government policy and taxation
were loosened to a traditional and therefore acceptable level.
VI. CONCLUSION: BURKE'S CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE
The three imperial conflicts with which Burke dealt extensively arose at different
times and presented him with many seemingly diverse circumstances. But he faced
226. See Speech on Conciliation, in SELECTED WRMNus, supra 171, at 145. In November, 1775, after six
months of heavy fighting, which included such notable battles as Bunker Hill, Burke still hoped for reconciliation.
In that month he delivered a second speech on conciliation, premised on the belief that the colonists were still
attempting to vindicate their rights under the English Constitution rather than seeking independence from the
empire. See Summary of the Second Speech on Conciliation, in SELECrE WRiTINGs, supra note 171, at 200. To
that end, Burke proposed a series of legislative initiatives meant to effect a reunification, including the passage of
a declaration making clear that Parliament would not tax the colonies and the granting of a general amnesty to those
who took up arms on the authority of the Continental Congress or other colonial assemblies. Id. at 201-06. Burke's
proposals received a sympathetic hearing and lost by a lesser margin than his other initiatives on America. See
Mahoney, supra note 173, at xviii. The Government would itself later offer Burke's proposals to the rebellious
colonists only to be rejected. Id. at xviii-xix.
227. "Obedience is what makes government, and not the names by which it is called . I... "d. at 139.
228. Writing in 1777, Burke stated:
[The American war is] in my humble opinion productive of many mischiefs, of a kind which distinguish
it from all others. Not only our policy is deranged, and our empire distracted, but our laws and our
legislative spirit appear to have been totally perverted by it. We have made war on our colonies, not by
arms only, but by laws. As hostility and laws are not very concordant ideas, every step we have taken
in this business, has been made by trampling on some maxim of justice, or some capital principle of
wise government .. "
See Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, I WoRKS 255.
War suspends the rules of moral obligation, and what is long suspended is in danger of being totally
abrogated. Civil wars strike deepest of all into the manners of the people. They vitiate their politics; they
corrupt their morals; they pervert even the natural taste and relish of equity and justice. By teaching us
to regard our fellow-citizens in a hostile light, the whole body of our nation becomes gradually less dear
to us.
Id.
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each with strikingly similar principles, methods, and goals. Chartered rights and
traditional ways of doing things are to be respected. Where the East India Company
enjoyed privileges and rights under charters granted to it by English and Indian
political authorities, it was obliged by correlative responsibilities and duties to
observe the moral order and respect the pre-existent culture. The natural law set
certain standards below which one must not descend. Efforts to stamp out the native
religion of Ireland were based on a "miserable" foundation-the premise that "I am
right and you are wrong." The British Constitution endowed Englishmen everywhere
with a love of liberty and a loathing of tyranny. The Americans were doing nothing
more than responding as loyal English subjects when they protested the innovations
introduced by Grenville and Townshend.
To gain and retain an empire requires skill and good will, as well as military
might. No people can be kept enslaved forever. They must either be destroyed-an
option Burke recoiled from as unjust-or somehow won over. But the very act of
ruling tends to lead the ruler into hubristic opinions and actions. "When any com-
munity is subordinately connected with another, the great danger of the connection
is the extreme pride and self-complacency of the superiour, which will probably
decide in its own favour." 29 And pride and self-complacency lead to tyranny and
revolt.
How, then, to maintain an empire? With a light and liberal hand. By recognizing
that other peoples have their own traditions, belief-systems, character, and
expectations. By recognizing that the Empire is a combination of various peoples. By
recognizing also that all governments, even empires, rest in the end on consent.
The institutional key to empire, as to liberty, was maintenance of countervailing
forces. Through a kind of federalism the empire would maintain local legislative
governance subject to infrequently applied Parliamentary superintendence and
supremacy. The more foreign the possession the less likely English governance
would prove beneficial and the less intrusive it should be. Burke sought to apply the
same rule to all issues of imperial concern: as loyalties grow from our little platoons
outward to more remote and so less familiar and loved persons, so governments must
recognize that their proper powers diminish as the group involved becomes more
distant or foreign-both culturally and geographically.
In this way, the authentic differences that exist between and among the world's
great cultures might be preserved. Burke realized that all persons share a common
pride that leads many to believe that they can force all persons to behave or to think
in a uniform manner. But for Burke, men and women of every culture share a right
to government that seeks to protect their happiness by maintaining the pre-existing
moral order. To destroy moral order in pursuit of any object, be it construction of a
perfect political order or the defense of unlimited claims of sovereignty, is to be a
229. Id. at 260.
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tyrant. It is to undermine the foundations of peace and happiness in pursuit of one's
self-centered theorizing.
Reflecting on England's failures in America, Burke observed:
[I]t was our duty... to conform our government to the character and
circumstances of the several peoples who composed this [empire's] mighty
and strangely diversified mass. I never was wild enough to conceive, that
one method would serve for the whole; that the natives of Hindostan and
those of Virginia could be ordered in the same manner; or that the Cutchery
court and the grand jury of Salem could be regulated on a similar plan. I was
persuaded that government was a practical thing, made for the happiness of
mankind, and not to furnish out a spectacle of uniformity, to gratify the
schemes of visionary politicians7O 0
230. Id. at 263-64.
